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PREFACE
This guide is intended to provide methodology and describe the intent of the Pressure Vessels
and Systems (PV/S) Certification Program. It is not meant to be a mandated document but is
intended to transmit a basic understanding of the PV/S program and include examples. After the
reader has familiarized himself with this publication, he should have a basic understanding of
how to go about developing a PV/S Certification Program.
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SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
This document defines the general principles and methods involved in certification of
pressure vessels and pressurized systems (PV/S), and is intended to serve as a guide for use at
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida, and other locations where KSC has design, operation and
maintenance (O&M), or sustaining engineering responsibility. The overall goal is to implement
a documentation, analysis, and inspection program which will provide a high degree of assurance
in the continued safe operation of the PWS under KSC cognizance. The major elements of this
certification program are as follows:
A comprehensive pressure vessel/system inventory, including the retrieval or
development of relevant design and manufacturing data.
Certification analysis of all pressure vessels and systems to determine degree of
compliance with applicable codes and standards.
Development and implementation of an inspection/testing program.
Maintaining fries of pressure vessels and systems documentation.
Preparation of certification reports which include results of findings and analysis
for all systems and vessels.
Implementation of an on going Inservice Inspection (ISI) program.
This document provides a general overview of the PV/S Certification process and contains
detail sections to supplement those areas where additional guidance is necessary. The
information presented in this document is based on experience and "lessons learned" from several
years of PV/S certification efforts at KSC and other NASA facilities.
1.2 Background
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has established a uniform
policy regarding the design, inspection and certification of PV/S which are owned by NASA or
used on NASA property. NASA Management Instruction NMI 1710.3, "Safety Program for
Pressure Vessels and Pressurized Systems," requires pressure vessels and pressurized systems be
certified and inspected in accordance with applicable codes, standards, and guides to the
maximum practical extent, and when deviations are required, supplemental analyses, tests and
examinations be performed to ensure safety of personnel, equipment, and facilities is not
compromised.
NASA Handbook NHB 1700.6, "Guide for Inservice Inspection of Ground-Based Pressure
Vessels and Systems," establishes an outline of Inservice Inspection and recertification procedures
for ground-based unfired PWS. This handbook provides the overall NASA requirements for
PWS and was written to be applied, as appropriate, to all NASA facilities.
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KSC issued management instruction KMI 1710.5 entitled "Certification Program for
Pressure Vessels and Pressurized Systems." KMI 1710.5 requires that PV/S be certified in
accordance with the current nationally recognized codes. KHB 1710.15, "KSC Pressure
Vessel/System Certification Handbook," explains responsibilities and provides instructions
concerning the documentation and certification of ground-based PV/S at KSC.
This guide is intended to serve as a major reference document for the performance of
PV/S certification at KSC. This document is controlled and subject to revision and updating as
informalion becomes available. The guidance provided in this document is intended to
supplement the information provided in applicable NASA and KSC management instructions and
handbooks and therefore is not intended to replace these documents as the primary source of
certification requirements.
1.3 Scope
In general, all PV/S at KSC must be certified as safe to operate, and must be periodically
recertified to maintain personnel and equipment safety. Some PV/S, however, are not required
to be certified due to their low potential for failure, low risk, and low stored energy. Guidelines
for exclusion are contained in Chapter 3 of KHB 1710.15. The following three tables categorize
fluids at KSC. Table 1-1 lists fluids considered to be nonhazardous and their standard
abbreviations. Table 1-2 lists fluids considered to be hazardous and their standard abbreviations.
Table 1-3 lists fluids considered to be lethal and their standard abbreviations.
TABLE 1-1 List of NON-HAZARDOUS FLUIDS
Fluids
Gaseous Argon
Compressed Air
Breathing Air
Gaseous Carbon Dioxide
Freon 114
Gaseous Helium
Hydraulic Fluid
Gaseous Nitrogen
Gaseous Oxygen
Water
Standard
Abbreviation
ARGON
AIR
BAIR
CO2
Fl14
GHE
HYD
GN2
GO2
WATER
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TABLE 1-2 List of HAZARDOUS FLUIDS
Fluids
Alcohol
Gaseous Hydrogen
Liquid Air
Liquid Hydrogen
Liquid Nitrogen
Liquid Oxygen
Liquified Petroleum Gas
Ammonia
Trichloroethylene
Standard
Abbreviation
ALCOH
GH2
LAIR
LH2
LN2
L02
LPG
NH3
TRICH
TABLE 1-3 List of LETHAL FLUIDS
Fluid
Aerozine 50
Hydrazine
Monomethyl Hydrazine
Unsymmetrical Dimethyl Hydrazine
Nitrogen Tetroxide
Standard
Abbreviation
A50
N2H4
MMH
UDMH
N204
Notes to Tables
o Lethal and hazardousfluids are defined in KHB1710.15.
o Standard abbreviations are from NASA Reference Publication 1059.
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Excluded items include low energy, low risk vessels and systems. These systems include
heating, ventilation, and cooling systems; potable water systems; and air systems. The following
items are excluded from the certification program based on the performance of normal routine
inspection and maintenance.
PV/S as described in KHB 1710.15, Chapter 3, such as fire extinguishers, heating
boilers, self-contained air breathing equipment, air conditioning systems, and
instrumentation.
Mobile equipment for gases and liquids covered by the Code of Federal
Regulations, Title 49.
Pressure gages used in systems which operate with pressure less than 150 psig are
excluded (for water system gages, a 250 psig exclusion applies).
Temporary flex hoses used for test or checkout purposes or to connect
portable/mobile equipment.
Utility compressed air systems with pressures less than 150 psi. This exclusion is
for uncontaminated compressed air used for air-operated tools and other shop-type
applications.
Vessels excluded from American Society of Mechanical Engineered (ASME)
Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code Section VIII, Division 1, paragraph U-
1, and Division 2, paragraph AG-121.
All potable water systems.
All clean water systems that have no potential for operation above 250 psig.
(Relief devices in these systems cannot be set above 250 psig.)
Launch associated water systems when maintained at less than 250 psig.
Hydraulic systems designed to consensus standards and considered as utility
services.
Exclusions for other low-energy, low-risk systems will be considered by the Pressure
Systems Manager (PSM). All proposed exclusions from the program will be presented as a
request for exemption. Requests for exemption should include all information about the PV/S
including fluid type, maximum operating pressures, pressure cycles, vessel and component types
and sizes, types of material used, and location of the system. The request for exemption should
be packaged with enough information to allow assessment of the potential hazards and for
justifying exclusion from the program. A sample exemption form, KSC Form 20-168,
Deviation/Waiver/Variance Request, is provided in Appendix C. Additional pages should be
attached, if necessary.
An example of a system that could have an exemption is a gaseous nitrogen piping system
of less than 150 psi design pressure that is outside, with no potential for a nitrogen leak to gather
and form oxygen deficient areas. Systems which can be verified as low hazard can obtain an
exemption.
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1.4 Role of Pressure Systems Manager
The Pressure Systems Manager (PSM) is responsible for reviewing and evaluating all
PV/S certification efforts at KSC. The role of the PSM is to continuously monitor and review
all certification efforts, as required, to establish a technical assessment of certification program
status. Monitoring will include periodic visits and interviews with cognizant NASA and
certification contractor staff and witnessing of selected field certification efforts. In order to
assure a smoothly functioning program by all certification personnel, the PSM or representative
will be responsible for the following:
Assuring necessary documentation to support the certification program is
maintained on all systems owned or operated by KSC or its contractors.
Reviewing/approving pressure vessel/system certification criteria for special cases
not covered in this document, reviewing certification implementation schedules,
defining required documentation, analysis, inspection, testing, nondestructive
examination, and reporting requirements for pressure vessels and pressurized
systems.
Evaluating exclusion criteria and approving exclusions other than those listed in
Chapter 3 of KHB 1710.15.
Reviewing disposition (i.e., rerate, repair, scrap) of all pressure vessels or systems
which do not pass inspection or testing requirements.
Reviewing, as necessary, hazardous and nonhazardous inspection and test
procedures utilized by the certification program to assure adequacy of safety
considerations.
Evaluating supplemental analyses, tests, procedures, and examinations.
Evaluating proposed wavers/deviations/variances involving pressure vessels and
systems covered by the certification program.
Maintaining a baseline inventory/status of all pressure vessels/systems for which
KSC has design/operational responsibility and preparing a yearly summary report
for NASA Headquarters.
Reviewing/evaluating KSC-wide implementation of KHB 1710.15.
Evaluating modifications to cerfified/recertified pressure vessels/systems to assure
compliance with KHB 1710.15.
Reviewing, evaluating, and retaining all PV/S certification reports.
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1.5 Interrelationship With Other Programs
The purpose of the certification program is to ensure the safety of personnel and
equipment by maintaining reliable pressure vessel/systems. Certain pressure components or
systems may be routinely tested to requirements which meet or exceed those of the certification
program. Such components should not be retested as part of the certification program, but the
documentation should be included in a certification package to verify the testing. Testing of
components is done to ensure the safety of personnel and equipment, not merely to obtain
certification documents.
For example, most safety relief valves are routinely tested under a recall program. The
testing of these valves ensures their continued safe use, and should be documented in a
certification package. Other types of programs include operation and maintenance instructions
(OMI's) and routine service checks. All possible test data sources should be used to supplement
the certification package and prevent redundant efforts.
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SECTION 2. CERTIFICATION PROGRAM OVERVIEW
2.1 Introduction
The PV/S Certification Program at KSC is undertaken to improve the overall reliability,
maintainability, safety, and efficiency of ground-based pressurized systems. The value of the
certification program is found in the increased confidence gained in the integrity of important
systems, the reduction in the potential for personnel injury, serious system failures, and long-term
system operational assurance. PV/S Certification is achieved through the application of a
program which combines the following major elements:
Field surveys and engineering design reviews performed per ASME Code Section
VIII, Divisions 1 and 2, ASME B31.3, and any other applicable facility design
codes and standards.
Inspection and testing plans are developed and implemented, and post inspection
analyses performed to provide assurance of the structural integrity, pressure-
retaining capability, and continued safe operation of key components.
A configuration management program is implemented for the control of all
documentation accumulated during the program to provide guidelines for program
coordination, and to provide a permanent tool for tracking the status and
configuration of each pressure vessel and system.
The following sections describe the steps involved in establishing a certification program,
including the long-term Inserviee Inspection (ISI) plan. The ISI program is designed to maintain
a high level of confidence in vessels and systems certified under the baseline program.
Typically, the certification program can be divided into three major phases:
. Phase I:
o Phase H:
o Phase HI:
Engineering Analysis, Configuration Baseline Development
and Inspection Planning
Inspection, Repair, Replacement Program
Inservice Inspection Program
Each of these phases is divided into individual subtasks. Each phase is described in this
section. Flow charts have been included to point out the relationship between program phases
and associated subtasks.
2.2 Phase I: Engineering Analysis, Configuration Baseline Development and
Inspection Planning
The certification of PV/S at KSC, many of which were designed and constructed over
twenty years ago, involves a number of unique problems. These problems areas follows:
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A completeinventoryof vesselsandcomponentsis typically unavailable.
Original documentationdescribingtheinitial designandsubsequentmodifications
is often incomplete.
Inspectionandrepairrecordsarewidelydispersedandarefrequentlyunavailable
for review.
Responsibilityfor repair,replacement,or modificationof a systemhas,typically,
not beencoordinatedby a singlegroupor individual.
This overall lack of an integrated program results in a loss of control over system
configuration and increases the possibility of service failures. The coordinator of an integrated
certification program must be prepared to begin with a careful inventory of system components,
followed by an exhaustive search for documentation on each item inventoried. Once this
database is established, an engineering design and operability evaluation using applicable codes
and standards can be conducted. To manage this task, KSC has developed certification guidelines
in the form of a hndbook (KHB 1710.15) to maintain consistency at KSC. The following
sections outline each of the subtasks involved in the initial task of this program. Figure 2-1
illustrates the major subtasks for Phase I of an Integrated Certification Program.
2.2.1 Field Surveys
A survey of all systems is the first step in developing an adequate database on all vessels,
relief devices, and associated components. This survey is designed to uniquely identify each
component, accumulate manufacturer nameplate data, and define system pressure boundaries.
In addition, all available system documentation should be gathered from the facility staff, as well
as any available data on operating history, including previous service fluids.
2.2.2 Preliminary Priority Grouping
To achieve an orderly review of documentation and perform engineering analysis on a
timely basis for high hazards systems, a priority grouping should be established. Priority levels
should reflect the PV/S current service and potential for injury to personnel and damage to one-
of-a-kind facilities. Certification efforts can then concentrate on those vessels and systems
involving the most hazard.
2-2
I OBTAIN MI881NGQCU IENTATION
M_ DOCUMBqTAlION
_ 8Ytmgd8 1VI585'EL8
I
I E8TU PRK3RffY
l
_N800CUM_A_N
I
MAJNTENANOE DOOUMENTATION
NO
[
SYSTEMS i
I
i --m-----_ i[ANSI B91.S, _, ETC.)
I _H
I
I
P_
I
m_ ANDI
mM_
Figure 2-1
VESSELS
ImmlPf JOlBCREPANT _ENT8
LONG- SHORT- TERM PRIORmES
_IN_ DOCUMENTA110N
_oom)
I
BAffiEIJNE RUE FOR VEBSEL
I
Phase I, EngineeringAnalysis, ConfigurnlJonBaseline and Inspoolk)n Planning
2-3
Oo.dnuld
YES
,ms NO
I REMOVE_EPtJ_E OOMOPONENT
I
Condmmd
I
CALCULATE VESSEL MAWP I
wrrH/_SME ILcC Vgl. DIV I I
I E_I'_,BI.18XINSI_ IN_
Cmrmd Conllnmd
(SYSTB_ O/BSB.S)
I=ioum2-1 (Continued) Phase I, EngineeringAnalysis, Conr_urotion Boseflneend InspectionPlanning
2-4
I _ RELIEF VALVE
._ RETAIN DISCREPANCIEz3IN FILES _ REFI_FtENCE
REMOVE FROM SERVICE
• ESTABLISH
"I:llETt.q_ TO- SS_NICE PLAN'
Condnued
I --+ IOVER-mESSURIZAI"ION
I_:w__ _
I REVIEW CYCLIC DATA FOREXTRAORI_N_rr 11_NS Eh'TlS
I
i +_-° iFROM R_=WS, EVALUATIONS/ASSESSMENT8
OFCONCm BY PRIoRrrY
I
WITH IMI_TE PRIORITY
SH(_rr- LOre - Te_ mK]vne_;
I
I ESTABU8H ENGINE_IINGANCFm TeST oe_cTwes
I
ENGINEERING N_L_81S
+t-
Figure 2-1 (Continued)Phase I, Engineedn o Analysis, Cont'_uraIion Baseline end Inspection Planning
2-5
Cunahad
DEFINE m
I UEk'n_
"10 RESOLVEB
_Y REMOVE/ RtC_ SBqiVIOE
D_B.OP IlmPE_n'1ON
ACCIFI"ANCE
J
I
lUBWICE N I_'qlON PLAN
END PHASE I BEGIN PHASE II J
Figure 2-1 (Contlnuecl) Phse I, Engineedng Analy_, Configuralion Baseline and In_xK:lJon Planning
2-6
2.2.3 Documentation Review, Retrieval, and Generation
The establishment of a database for each vessel and system is the first task in the
development of a complete configuration management program. The preliminary task in this
process is the accumulation and review of documentation gathered from the facility archives and
site personnel. Verbal histories from site personnel can be a valuable source of information and,
thus, should be carefully documented. This verbal information is, typically, compiled as part of
the initial system survey. Due to the age of many systems, written documentation is often
incomplete or unavailable. However, its retrieval provides an important part of operational
history. Documentation on pressure vessels can be obtained from a number of sources,
depending on the status of the original design. General categories of surveyed vessels are:
Pressure Vessels Manufactured to ASME Code Specifications_ with ASME
Code Stamp and National Board Number
The Manufacturers' Data Report (ASME Form U-1 or equivalent) can be obtained
from the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors, Columbus,
Ohio, for a minimal charge. It should be noted that only those ASME coded
vessels with National Board (NB) numbers are on f'de at the NB (and even then,
not all NB stamped pressure vessels have records on file with the NB).
Pressure Vessels Manufactured to ASME Code Specifications with ASME
Code Stamp but no National Board Number
The only source of Manufacturers' Data Reports for these vessels are the original
manufacturer, or past or current owners of the vessel. Manufacturers will,
typically, purge their files periodically and therefore retain records for a relatively
short period of time. Additionally, many manufacturers may have gone out of
business or may no longer produce vessels and associated components. The past
or current owners of the vessels may have no requirements to retain records of
certification on their pressure vessels and, typically, have no design
documentation.
Pressure Vessels Manufactured to ASME Code Specifications but not ASME
Code Stamped at Time of Manufacture
Manufacturers' Data Reports for these vessels may have never been completed.
Although the pressure vessel may meet all ASME design requirements, the
purchasing organization did not require ASME certification or inspection;
therefore, no official data is available. Engineering drawings may be available
from the manufacturer, including a majority of the information required for
certification analysis. It should be noted the majority of these pressure vessels
were not originally inspected per the requirements of the NB.
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Pressure Vessels not Manufactured to ASME Code Specifications
The manufactures may have original drawings or reports on material specifications
and inspection results. These pressure vessels may be constructed from non-
ASME materials for specific operational requirements. Often pressure vessels
built for military usage or to other government design specifications will fall in
this category.
The task of documentation review and retrieval may be time consuming and complex,
involving numerous phone contacts to trace down one drawing or Manufacturers' Data Report.
If documentation cannot be retrieved through this process, it is necessary to develop equivalent
information from the vessel or component itself. This generation of design information may
involve nondestructive testing and the production of system and component drawings.
2.2.4 Configuration Management Program Development
All tasks previously described have been designed to establish a baseline configuration
management program. That is, all information accumulated is compiled in a centralized area.
This documentation f'fle should be maintained with up-to-date PV/S certification documentation.
This will include changes to the documentation resulting from repairs, replacement, modification,
or inspection of the pressure vessels or components. The configuration management program sets
guidelines for all documentation which will be generated as part of the future tasks, including
engineering analysis, recertification and Inservice Inspection results, system and component
drawings, and system and component data.
2.2.5 Engineering Analysis
The documentation describing the system, components and vessels design compiled as part
of the baseline configuration management program, is reviewed using the ASME Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code Section VIII, Divisions 1 and 2, ASME B31.3, and additional appropriate
codes and standards to determine whether a vessel or component is in compliance.
The Code Design Review consists of a certification of the original design against present
code requirements. This may include recalculation of vessel wall thickness, design pressure, and
re-evaluation of service conditions. The Code Design Review and Analysis can result in tentative
certification to existing design pressure under current code requirements. Further engineering
analysis using advanced techniques like Fracture Mechanics, Strain Energy Modeling, or Finite
Element Modeling may be required for a complete vessel analysis. This additional analysis is
acceptable if ASME Section VIII, Division 2, is used to certify a particular vessel. It has been
found that a pressure vessel or system may require derating from the nameplate working pressure
or require physical modification for a number of reasons: (1) the original design code
specifications may have been incorrectly applied; (2) material specifications may have changed
since the original design and manufacture; (3) the current code specifications may be different
from the original specifications; (4) the existing pressure vessel application is not in conformance
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with its originaldesign intent; and (5) relief devices, piping, or components may be inappropriate
for current service.
2.2.6 Inspection Program Development
The development of a vessel and system-specific inspection program establishes baseline
data for both the initial certification and for a long-term Inservice Inspection (ISI) plan. The
documentation available from field surveys and through configuration management baseline
programs is required to confmn the initial design, operation, maintenance, and existing inspection
criteria for the vessels or systems. Additional inspection may be identified at this time to
confirm the present design configuration. If minimal documentation is available, and the
operating history is not confu'med, extensive examination may be required to establish baseline
data on the condition of system components and their individual integrity. Phase I is designed
to implement the acceptance criteria for inspections, develop system/component-specific
inspections, and develop uniform site-specific inspection and test procedures.
2.2.7 Preliminary Certification and Inservice Inspection and Test Program
Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) is the primary means for providing assurance of the
....... structural integrity, pressure-retaining capability, and safe operation of the vessels and systems.
Specific examination requirements can be developed for each system, including all system
components such as vessels, piping, threaded fittings and welds, relief valves, pressure gages and
switches, clamps and support structures, and flexible hoses. The examinations and tests are based
on the results of the preliminary engineering analysis of this program and the programs currently
in place at KSC.
These examinations and tests are selected on a case-by-case basis, as applicable to a given
system or component.
2.2.8 Field Verification
Following the development of the initial system-specific certification and ISI plan, a field
verification for system configuration and inspectability should be conducted. This field
verification should note any inconsistencies between system operating characteristics and the
documentation available. Included in the field verification are any operational and/or physical
• access constraints that preclude the use of any specific NDE techniques. The surveyor should
be familiar with the NDE practices/techniques required, and the operational restraints placed on
the system by the facility staff, prior to initiating the field verification.
Results from the field verification may indicate further testing, engineering analysis,
component repair, or component replacement are required. Complete documentation of all
f'mdings is required for baseline documentation.
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2.2.9 Summary of Phase I
The results of Phase I of the Certification Program are preliminary in nature, establishing
operating conditions and setting the foundation for the inspection program. Initial Inservice
Inspection (ISI) programs can be established at this lime; however, the results of any test program
may alter inspection schedules.
Phase I preliminary engineering analysis, configuration baseline development and
inspection phase is summarized below:
A preliminary field survey is completed to establish the inventory of pressure
vessels, components, and system boundaries.
A priority grouping is established based on location, contents, potential for failure,
and impact of failure.
Documentation review, retrieval, and generation is performed to establish the
configuration management baseline.
An engineering design review is undertaken using applicable codes and standards
to provide preliminary certification of design pressure and service conditions.
Preliminary certification inspections and tests are developed to generate system or
vessel specification.
A field verification is completed to assure that the system configuration,
examinations, and tests are compatible and current with system operation.
Certification and ISI plans are finalized to establish the program basis for Phase
111, program implementation.
2.3. Phase H: Inspection, Repair, Replacement Program
Once a complete system baseline is established, it becomes necessary to implement an
inspection program and a repair program to bring a system to current requirements. Typically,
the field verification of a system, as discussed in Phase I, identifies the requirements for further
inspections, replacement, or repair. Figure 2-2 illustrates the major subtasks for Phase II of a
certification program. Care in coordinating the implementation of Phase II to minimize impact
on facility operations is an important consideration.
2.3.1 Inspection
The NDE's performed on a vessel or system may detect unacceptable indications.
•Detailed acceptance/rejection criteria can be found in the applicable portions of consensus codes
and standards. Unacceptable indications may result from these inspections. At times, all of the
information on these unacceptable indications may not be available, due to the limits of the
inspection technique, to make an accurate judgment. Hence, an additional inspection method may
be prescribed to further characterize a faulted area. It is important to note that some techniques
may show an area as acceptable, where another technique would show the same area as
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unacceptable.Therefore,it becomesextremelyimportantto understand the geometry, fit-up,
inspection limitations, and material properties for the area of interesL
If, upon completion of all inspections, the faulted area is unacceptable, then additional
engineering analysis may be performed for the flaw as discussed in Phase I. The engineering
analysis will conclude one of three results: (1) continue operation or modify operation with an
ISI program suited to monitor the flaw, (2) recommendation for repair of the component with
return to service or, (3) remove the component from service.
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2.3.2 Repair
In-place repairs to system components are typically limited to the vessels or system
piping/tubing. Other system components at KSC, such as valves, filters and regulators are
typically inspected/repaired on an as-fail basis or, if the component is critical to launch
operations, monitored in a preventive maintenance program. Pressure gages, relief valves, and
flex hoses are monitored in a recall program.
All repairs to vessels and system must meet the requirements of the appropriate KSC
design standards. It is prudent to provide KSC's Pressure Systems Manager visibility over the
requirements for repair, the repair process, and results of the repair program. All vessel
modifications must be reviewed by the O&M/design organization before work is initiated.
Repairs to the system pipe/tube network should be made by qualified personnel. System
repairs should met the requirements of ASME B31.3 or the appropriate KSC design standard.
Special attention should be given to those materials sensitive to heat input from weld processes.
Additionally, operational service may dictate the level of quality associated with the repair.
Repairs to vessels should meet the requirements of the National Board of Pressure Vessels
Inspectors Handbook, NB-23, and the appropriate KSC design standard. Additionally, repairs
on vessels should meet the requirements of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, with the
exception that an R-stamp is only required for vessels that have an ASME Code stamping. An
equivalent level of quality, integrity, and documentation must be maintained for non-coded
vessels. For vessels that were not originally registered with the National Board, alternate "R-1"
repair forms can be obtained through third party inspectors and registered in their f'des.
Upon final acceptance of the repair, a revision to the baseline certification should be
provided to maintain a current configuration of the pressurized systems.
2.3.3 Replacement
Replacement of a component is an acceptable method to correct faulted conditions. It is
beneficial to perform a cost study between alternatives prior to initiating a replacement program.
In specifying a replacement component, care is required to match the new component with
the system service conditions (i.e., design pressure, service fluids, and operating parameters) and
that the new component is acceptable to KSC's design requirements and consensus standards.
When a component is replaced, the certification report may require updating to reflect the
new system configuration.
When replacing a component, the old item, if no longer useable, should be configured in
such a manner that it becomes inoperable. For example, pressure vessels should be drilled or cut
so that they no longer can hold pressure (Ref. KHB 1710.15, Chapter 9, paragraph 902).
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2.4 Phase HI: Inservice Inspections
An Inservice Inspection (ISI) and test plan is a list of inspections and tests, and the
frequency, to be performed on the PV/S. The plan is designed to provide assurance that any
concerns identified in the certification process are monitored and re-evaluated on a periodic basis.
Figure 2-3 illustrates the major subtasks for Phase ffl of a certification program. Hence, the plan
is developed based upon the results analyzed in the engineering evaluation of the certification
process.
2.4.1 Development
Criteria for establishing an ISI Program is based on the system configuration and results
of Phase I and II. Additionally, the hazard level associated with the systems operating conditions
and proximity to populated facilities are considerations. Recertification of PV/S should not
exceed a 20 year period for any system.
Guidelines for system ISI are found in NHB 1700.6. However, each certification
contractor in evaluating each system in earlier program phases may alter these guidelines to meet
the systems operational expectations.
2.4.2 Implementation
The configuration database and baseline certification report identify the specific system
ISI Plans. The initial ISI Program established through the guidelines of NHB 1700.6 can be
modified to reflect a different inspection interval as discussed in Phase II. Implementation of
these plans is required over a lengthy service period.
To ensure each component is inspected at timely intervals, an active database which tracks
the component and inspection data must be maintained.
Some methods available to monitor ISI at KSC include: operational recall; maintenance;
scheduling database; the certification database requirements of KHB 1710.15; or the establishment
of a separate, monitored database by the PWS certification group. With proper input, systems
configuration, maintainability, reliability and service conditions wiU be monitored and remain
current for the certification period.
Upon completion of each ISI task or groups of tasks, the present system configuration
should be reviewed against the baseline configuration. Hence, system degradation will be
monitored, and the system baseline reports will be accurately maintained.
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SECTION 3. PV/S INVENTORY AND CERTIFICATION
DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS
3.1 Overview
Establishment of an inventory of PWS, followed by the collection of certification
documentation, is the first step in the performance of a certification program and provides the
basis for the certification program. Included in this effort are reviews of existing inventory lists,
drawings, and documentation files, as well as actual field surveys of the PWS.
3.2 Field Survey for PV/S Inventory
A survey of all PV/S is the first step in developing an adequate database on all systems,
vessels, and components. The survey should result in a detailed inventory of all PV/S and
pressure vessels to be included in the certification program. The exclusion criteria discussed in
Section 1.3 can be used in screening systems, along with Chapter 3 of KHB 1710.15. The resultant
inventory list of systems and vessels will then become the basis for scheduling and implementing
the remaining certification tasks.
KHB 1710.15, Chapter 10, requires all PWS included in the certification program be
identified in an inventory and certification status database. The reporting requirements sheets of
KHB 1710.15 provide the minimum database input requirements for PV/S, and their certification
status. The database files are to be updated quarterly by each PV/S organization. All KSC
organizations participating in the certification program are required to provide updates to the
Pressure System Manager.
Verification of the initial inventory lists can be performed in conjunction with the initial
field survey. A primary concern during the inventory verification is that all PWS requiring
certification are included. In addition, a review of the listing should eliminate PV/S that should
not be included in the certification program. Any system that should be included in the program,
but is not identified properly by the responsible contractor, should not be deleted from the
program, but should be correctly identified to reflect the proper responsibility.
Pressure systems should be identified by location and fluid contents. System boundaries
are generally associated with the charging or filling station and the ultimate usage points.
System-to-system interfaces are generally designated at a valve which separates different
commodities or users. Further, pneumatic systems are often defined by operating pressure; i.e.,
establishing boundaries at major pressure regulators.
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3.3 PV/S Certification Documentation
Chapter 4 of KHB 1710.15 identifies the documentation required for PV/S certification and
is presented here for continuity. Specific documentation required is as follows:
Documentation Required for Vessels
(A) Manufacturer's drawings. The drawings can be either certified shop
fabrication drawings or as-built drawings. The drawings should contain
the following:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
Manufacturer's Name.
Date of Manufacture (may be stamped on vessel nameplate).
Dimensions and details of construction.
Design and operating conditions, including service fluid, operating
temperature, and maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP).
Material Thicknesses (head, shell, etc.).
Corrosion Allowance.
Identificationof materials, including type of alloy, tensile
properties,impact properties,etc.
Efficiencyof weld joints.
Nondestructive evaluationsperformed (radiographic,ultrasonic,
magnetic particle,etc.).
Types of tests performed (hydrostatic, pneumatic).
fa) Design calculations. Design calculations for pressure vessels, which
include MAWP and/or design pressure, static head, temperature, wind,
vibration, and any other applicable loadings. The applicable codes,
standards, or other design basis should be indicated. If the manufacturer's
calculations are unavailable, then an engineering evaluation/code
compliance evaluation as described in KHB 1710.15, Chapter 5, should be
performed.
(c) Manufacturer's Data Report (ASME Forms U-l, U-LA, U-2, U-3, U-4 as
applicable). Manufacturer's Data Reports are furnished with all
components built to the rules of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code. For Non-Code vessels, the original manufacturer, in most cases,
maintains a file of the original design configuration, materials properties
and inspections.
(D) Inspection and test records such as hydrostatic test, ultrasonic, magnetic
particle, etc.
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(E) Facsimile of nameplate stamping. If not provided by the manufacturer, a
pencil rubbing of the actual vessel nameplate as stamped, may be prepared.
A photograph which legibly shows all the nameplate data is also
acceptable.
Documentation Required for Systems
(A) End-to-end system drawings/schematics which show, as a minimum,
system operating pressure, safety device settings, line sizes, and wall
thicknesses of piping/tubing. All components (valves, regulators, filters,
pressure gages, etc.) should be identified by part number traceable to the
manufacturer. Sufficient fabrication/installation documentation detail
should be available to enable analyses to be performed to verify structural
adequacy and compliance with design standards for supports, brackets,
anchors, etc.
(B) KSC component specification drawing/component maintenance drawing or
equivalent, and/or vendor data for each unique component in the system,
suitable for verifying pressure rating, materials of construction, flow
parameters, operating characteristics, and relief device capability to
maintain system pressure within code-allowable limits.
(c) Approved operating or preventive maintenance procedures (OMI's, PMI's)
or equivalent, which include requirements regarding periodic maintenance
of system components (i.e. relief devices, gages, etc.).
3.4 Sources for Documentation
Much of the documentation identified in the previous section may be available through
various sources at KSC/CCAFS, including engineering documentation centers, procurement office
files, system operator files, system designer files, or from other cognizant facility personnel.
Some documentation collection may require going to outside sources, including the National
Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessels Inspectors, component manufacturers/vendors, and previous
system operators/owners. Further discussion on the approach used in collecting documentation
and other pertinent information is provided in the subsections that follow.
3.4.1 Record Nameplate Data
Recording of nameplate data from pressure vessels is important to the accumulation of
documentation. A special form entitled "Pressure Vessel Nameplate Review" (Appendix C) has
been developed, based on the ASME Code marking requirements, to assist in recording pertinent
data from vessels.
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During the initial field survey, the form can be filled out from information on the
nameplate affixed to each pressure vessel by the manufacturer. The Serial Number, National
Board Number, and Manufacturer's Name obtained from the nameplate are invaluable in
obtaining required data for certification (keep in mind some vessels may not have a National
Board Number). Nameplates may be painted over and will require the paint to be removed
before the data can be recorded. On pressure vessels which do not have nameplates attached,
look for data stamped into the head of the vessel, which may be traceable to the fabrication
facility. Nameplates may also be found affixed to some part of the vessel support structure.
3.4.2 KSC Documentation Sources
Primary sources of drawings, vendor data, historic records, specifications, etc., which will
assist in the preparation of certification packages, are contractor and government files located at
KSC.
Contractors responsible for operation and maintenance (O&M) and engineering functions
may have documentation files containing many of the required items needed for certification.
The O&M fries are generally on site where the systems and facilities are located. Historical
records, such as equipment operating and maintenance data sheets and procedures, may be found
._ at these facilities.. Drawings and system schematics are generally kept current by site personnel.
Therefore, an investigation of files kept by system operating personnel is helpful in locating
pertinent documentation. Engineering and configuration management files within the contractor
organizations will provide information on vendor data, drawings, specifications, and
modifications. In many cases, if manufacturers' serial numbers for vessels differ by only one or
two numbers, the drawings for one vessel may provide information about the other vessels.
Government documentation sources exist in libraries, archives, and various documentation
centers located at KSC. The KSC Library, located in the Headquarters Building (M6-399), has
specifications and standards on f'de. Also, the Engineering Documentation Center (EDC) is
located in the Headquarters Building, Room 3430. Many government branch and section offices
also have documentation files where specific systems data is maintained. These files are
generally the property of individuals responsible for specific systems.
3.4.3 Outside Sources of Documentation
Documentation required for PV/S certification, which is not available from on-site
sources, may often be obtained from sources within the industry and, perhaps, from other
government facilities. Manufacturers' Data Reports for ASME Ceded and Registered vessels can
usually be obtained from the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessels Inspectors, 1055
Crupper Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43299.
Generally, for all vessels, the original manufacturer should be contacted for vessel design
drawings, data sheets, design calculations, fabrication data, test data, and other pertinent
information which will assist vessel certification. Although manufacturers' data, typically, may
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bepurchased(if available),a singledrawingor calculationwill besuitablefor multiple vessels
of identical designand construction. Severalpressurevesselmanufacturersare identified in
Table 3-1,with geographicallocationandphonenumber,whereavailable.
Pertinentpressurevesselcertificationdatamayalsoresidewith thepreviousownerof the
vessel(i.e.,prior to KSCNASAprocurement).A searchof procurementdocumentsmayidentify
apreviousownerof thepressurevesselandgiveacontactsource,suchasanotherNASA facility,
military installation, or industrial facility. Contactingtheseprevious sourcesmay produce
pertinentinformationfor fatiguelife analysisandservicehistory. Vendordata for components
suchasvalves,gages,ftlters, etc.,which is not availableon site,is bestobtaineddirectly from
the vendor.
TABLE 3-1 Pressure Vessel Manufacturers
Manufacturer Location Telephone Notes
A. O. Smith Corp.
Advance Tank
Air Products 12
American Bosch
American Standard
American Welding Mfg. Co.
Autoclave Engineers, Inc
Buehler Tank & Welding Works
Butane Tank Corp.
Capital Westward Mfg.
Chicago Bridge and Iron (CF Braun Co.)
Cryenco
Delta Tank Mfg. Co.
Douglas Aircraft LB
Downey Welding & Mfg. Co.
Environment Inc.
Foster Wheeler
Grave
Greer-Hydraulics, Inc.
Harsco Corp.
Haskel Engrg & Supply Co.
Hoke, In.
Horton Tank/Chicago Bridge & Iron
Milwaukee, WI
Green Bay, WI
Allentown, PA
Springfield, MA
Detroit, MI
Jessup, GA
Erie, PA
Orange, CA
Los Angeles, CA
Paramount, CA
Chicago, IL
Denver, CO
Macon, GA
Long Beach, CA
Downey, CA
Van Nuys, CA
Dansville, NY
Pasadena, TX
Los Angeles, CA
Bloomfield, IA
Burbank, CA
Cresskill, NJ
Chicago, IL
(continued)
414-447-4409 (1)
414-276-8348
215-481-4911
413-781-2200
313-931-4000
* (2)
814-838-2071
714-538-8805
213-261-5118
213-634-2013 (3)
312-427-6708
303-287-3371
213-923-9616
716-335-3131
713-474-5121
213-725-0110
* (2)
213-843-4000
201-568-9100
312-427-6708 (4)
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TABLE 3-1 (Continued)
C. E. Howard Corp.
Hydrill Company
Herrick L. Johnston, Inc.
Kaiser Steel Corp.
LA Boiler Works
Leader Iron Works
Marison
NASA/Teledyne
Nash Machine Co.
Nat'l Annealing Box Co.
Nat'l Pittsburgh/US Steel
Nat'l Tank & Mfg. Co.
Nat'l Tube/US Steel
Nooter Corp.
Plant City Steel
Southwest Fab & Welding Co
Steel & Alloy Tank
Struther Wells
Taylor Forge
U. S. Steel Corp.
Water Treatment Co.
Westward Engrg & Mfg Co.
Pressure Vessel Manufacturers
South Gate, CA
Houston, TX
Columbus, OH
Napa, CA
Los Angeles, CA
Decatur, IL
South Elgin, IL
Huntsville, AL
,
Washington, PA
Mckeesport, PA
Los Angeles, CA
Mckeesport, PA
St. Louis, MO
Clearwater, FL
Houston, TX
Newark, NJ
Titusville, PA
Paola, KS
Mckeesport, PA
Paramount, CA
213-961-1502
713-449-2000
,
707-224-5421
213-221-1186
312-742-2500
205-453-2121
412-225-6000
412-664-6613
213-583-1841
412-664-6613
314-621-6000
813-752-1133
713-928-3451
814-726-1000
913-294-5331
412-664-6636
213-634-2013
(1)
(2)
(5)
(2)
Notes
(1) All documentation stored by A.O. Smith was destroyed or discarded. Vessel
drawings can be obtained from Nooter Corporation.
(2) American Welding and Mfg. Co. and Harsco Corporation are subsidiaries of Plant
City Steel.
(3) Capital Welding merged with Westward Engineering and Manufacturing Company
to form Capital Westward.
(4) Horton Tank is a subsidiary of Chicago Bridge and Iron.
(5) Vessel documentation is discarded after 3 years.
* .. No information about the company has been obtained.
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3.5 Documentation Verification
All PV/S documentation collected as part of the certification process should be verified
for accuracy in accordance with KHB 1710.15. Verification is generally accomplished through
field investigations. This will include system walkdowns, nameplate reviews, component serial
number (or other identifying number), and relief valve and flexible hose marking verification.
The system drawings should be reviewed during the walkdown to verify component
manufacturers nameplate data, as-built configuration, piping/tubing (size, schedule, and wall
thickness), connection fittings (type, size, and schedule). The drawings should be redlined for
engineering update to include the required system information.
3.6 Priority Categories
The sequence of system/vessel certification should be established according to the
following priority categories:
Category A - located near administrative office complexes, cafeteria, public and
private roads, and land--where if a mishap occurred it would probably affect
nonoperational personnel not associated with the facility--and non-related facilities
(highest priority).
Category B - so located that a mishap would probably only affect the immediate
operating personnel or the immediate facility. Barricades, natural terrain, etc.,
may be used as methods of providing protection of nearby personnel and facilities.
Category C - all vessels/systems not covered by Category A or B, e.g., inactive
systems, derated systems retaining a small positive pressure to prevent seal
damage or internal contamination, etc.
When pressure vessels/systems (PV/S) meet the requirements for two categories,
the highest priority category should be assigned.
The purpose of establishing priority categories is to provide certification efforts on PV/S
of the greatest potential hazard to personnel before those of relatively low hazard. Priority
Category "A" PV/S should, therefore, be investigated before Priority Category "B" PV/S. This
philosophy may be incorporated into a more detailed system-by-system certification schedule.
Within a given priority category, systems may be evaluated on a relative hazard basis. For
example, hypergolic (lethal) and high pressure gas systems would be analyzed, inspected, tested,
and repaired/replaced/modified before low pressure nonlethal/nonhazardous fluid systems.
To establish a sequence within a Category, a multi-level priority grouping can be used to
rank each vessel/system with respect to relative potential hazard. Priority groups should be
developed to reflect the PV/S current service and potential hazards to personnel. Certification
should begin with the highest categories (ie. Category A) and then the highest priority group
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within that category. The following describesthe recommendedpriority groupby serviceand
specialconsiderations.
Priority Group 1: Systemsand vesselscontaininglethal substances(including
hypergolics)and pneumaticsystemsandvesselswith designpressuresof 3000
psig or greater.
Priority Group2: Flammable/combustiblefluid systemsandpneumaticsystems
with designpressureslessthan3000psig.
Priority Group3: Cryogenicsystemsandvesselsandother liquid systems(e.g.,
hydraulics).
3.7 Certification Database
To assist in the tracing and management of the PV/S Certification Program, KSC has
developed and implemented a PV/S Certification Database. This database is accessible to all
KSC PV/S contractors and is a requirement of KHB 1710.15. The database itself is a user
friendly, menu driven, multi-tiered, program that is personal computer (PC) based.
The documentation generated during the three program phases becomes the input into the
database. In general, the input parameters for pressure vessels includes the nameplate data,
design and operating pressure, ISI tests and due dates, along with the system/vessel identifier.
Input parameters for the system within the database are similar, except that the only components
tracked are those within a periodic recall system (i.e., pressure gages and transducers, relief
devices, and flex hoses). These will only be tracked to the extent necessary to ensure that the
periodic inspection, testing, and calibration required in the ISI program is being performed.
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SECTION 4. ENGINEERING EVALUATION
4.1 Overview
Certification of PWS requires an engineering evaluation of all pertinent documentation,
an evaluation of the system and components in the as-built condition, and an evaluation of
inspection and test results. The objective of certification engineering evaluations are to (1)
determine the extent of conformance of PV/S designs with applicable codes, standards, and
guidelines, (2) assess the structural integrity of PV/S through review of inspection and test
results, and (3) resolve deficiencies in design or integrity by developing and implementing
suitable repair, replacement, or modification work packages.
4.2 Documentation Evaluation
PV/S documentation must be analyzed to determine suitability as a basis for certification,
as required by KHB 1710.15, Chapter 5. Documentation is determined suitable if the detail
provided establishes the design and integrity of PV/S to be in conformance with applicable codes
and standards to the maximum practical extent. Documentation required and sources for
documentation retrieval were described in section 3. Fluid system designs are to be in
conformance with the following KSC standards, as applicable:
KSC-STD-Z-0005 Design of Pneumatic Ground Support Equipment
KSC-STD-Z-0006 Design of Hypergolic Propellants Ground Support Equipment
KSC-STD-Z-0007 Design of Hydrocarbon Fuel Ground Support Equipment
KSC-STD-Z-0008 Design of Ground Life Support Systems and Equipment
KSC-STD-Z-0009 Design of Cryogenic Ground Support Equipment
KSC-STD-Z-0010 Design of Environmental Control Systems, Ground Coolant
Systems, Coolant Servicing Systems, and Ground Support
Equipment
These standards, latest editions are considered baseline documents for the KSC PV/S
certification program, and establish the engineering and technical limitations for materials,
processes, methods, engineering practices, and design as applied to a given fluid system type.
These KSC standards incorporate, by reference, other NASA/KSC and industry standards for
fabrication, design, and installation of system components (e.g., vessels, types of valves, pressure
gages, flex hoses, piping/tubing, fittings, etc.). The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,
Section VIII, Division 1 or 2 as applicable, is the referenced code for the design and fabrication
of stationary, unfired, pressure vessels. For example, Divisions 1 and 2 are referenced in KSC-
STD-Z-0005. Certification of PWS at KSC was baselined with the 1983 edition, winter 1984
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addenda,of ASME Code, Section Vm. In general, the latest edition and addenda of the
referenced codes and standards will be considered the governing documents for future PV/S
certification.
The following industry societies and associations can be contacted to obtain copies of
referenced codes and standards:
ANSI Standards prepared by the American National Standards Institute
1430 Broadway
New York, New York 10018
(212) 868-1220
API Standards, prepared by the American Petroleum Institute
1801 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 457-7000
ASME Code, prepared by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
345 East 47th Street
New York, New York 10017
(212) 705-7722
ASTM Standards, prepared by the American Society for Testing and Materials
1916 Race Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103
(215) 299-5400
CGA Standards, prepared by the Compressed Gas Association
500 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10036
(212) 524-4796
NFPA Standards, prepared by the National Fire Protection Association
470 Atlantic Avenue
Boston, Massachusetts 02210
(617) 482-8755
4.3 Engineering Analysis
Engineering analysis is generally required during the PV/S certification process leading
up to the development of engineering work packages, and following the implementation of these
packages. Typically, analysis performed prior to the preparation of engineering work packages
includes the development of design calculations for pressure vessels and components to support
an otherwise incomplete documentation package, and/or the performance of alternate calculations,
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asnecessary,to assurethatthesystem/componentsdesign,designdocumentationandcomponent
integrity meet current specifiedcriteria. The extentof the engineeringanalysisperformed
dependson the completeness and accuracy of design documentation, the importance of the
system, safety, design complexity, degree of standardization, and similarity to previously proven
designs.
4.3.1 Vessel Design Verification
Calculations are required for every pressure vessel. In some cases, calculations are part
of the documentation obtained from the manufacturer, while in some cases, calculations are
unavailable. In these cases, calculations must be performed and documented.
For example, if design calculations for pressure vessels are not obtained through
other sources, they must be generated and should include head, shell, and nozzle
calculations including pressure, static head, dead weight, wind, and vibration
loads, where applicable, as required by ASME Code, Section VIH.
The ultimate responsibility for the vessel analysis lies with the engineer performing the
calculations. According to the ASME Code, the basic concerns which must be addressed as
follows:
Shells with Internal Pressure
Heads with Internal Pressure
Nozzle Neck Thickness
Opening Reinforcement
Flanges and Pipe Fittings
Material
Quality of Workmanship
Typically, the shell is the limiting factor in the design pressure calculations for pressure
vessels. In fact, the circumferential stress calculation usually determines the design pressure.
Care should be taken to ensure that the proper joint efficiencies and material allowable stresses
are used for each calculation. The intent of the code calculations is to ensure the vessels have
adequate safety margins at design pressures. Whenever there are discrepancies between the code
and the manufacturer's design, the more conservative method is recommended, unless sufficient
analysis and documentation are provided to justify the deviation.
Head calculations are required and should use the appropriate equations for each specific
head geometry. Just as in the shell, proper joint efficiency and material allowable stresses must
be used with each calculation. The six basic types of heads- ellipsoidal, torispherical,
hemispherical, conical, toriconical, and flat--all use different equations for determining design
pressure.
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ASME also providesguidancein performingcalculationsfor nozzleneck thickness,
openingreinforcement,andflangedesignfor attachmentsto a vessel.Additionally, all pressure
retaining boundariesmust be adequateto meetdesignloads. Stressesin the vesselmust be
analyzed,aswell astheeffectson the vessel at the saddle/vessel interface. Stresses in the support
structure must be analyzed where the condition of the support is suspect. The adequacy of the
support structures to withstand operating loads may, generally, be determined through visual
examination. Calculations for the support structures are required when unacceptable conditions
are found during the visual examination. Good engineering practices and interpretations of the
ASME Code, along with KSC design standards, should be applied as appropriate.
Additional calculations may be required for external mechanical loads such as wind,
seismic, dead weight, vibration, piping, impact, or temperature-induced loads. The effect of these
loads must be assessed for each vessel with explanation provided, if the loads are deemed
negligible. For the case of vacuum jacketed vessels, the stated MAWP of the vessel should
include the vacuum pressure of the vessel annular space.
4.3.2 Additional Vessel/System Analysis
A more detailed stress analysis may be required if a vessel is to be certified in comphance
with ASME Code, Section VIII, Division 2. Division 2 provides design calculations for those
geometries found in Division 1. However, unlike Division 1, Division 2 allows lower safety
margins (i.e., higher allowable stresses) in most instances for identical materials, hence allowing
for higher design pressures. Fatigue now becomes a primary design concern, and a cychc history
review is required to determine the materials adequacy to continue in safe operation. Additional
analysis performed prior to implementing engineering work packages for a complete system may
include-
Determination of adequate pipe/tube wall thickness
Piping and component material compatibility
Safety relief valve set point and flow capability calculations
Pipe whip calculations
Piping support analysis
Fatigue analysis
Adequacy of component pressure ratings
Following the documentation evaluation, the performance of supporting engineering
analysis, and a review of visual examination results, engineering work packages may have to be
developed. These packages define, for implementation, the special inspections and tests, repairs,
replacement, or modifications necessary to establish the PV/S as certifmble.
Visual examination, followed by more involved nondestructive testing, may identify
defects or discontinuities in the system and components which require analysis to assure that the
system integrity is not compromised.
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The typesof analyseswhich may be requiredfor faultedcomponentintegrity include
fracturemechanicsanddetailedstressanalysis,andcould leadto adestructiveanalysisinvolving
mechanicalpropertytesting,chemicalanalysis,fractography,andmetaUography,dependingon
thetype andcauseof thediscontinuitiesidentified. Lossof wall thicknessin pressureretaining
componentsfrom corrosion,erosion,or wearwill requireanalysisto assureadequacyof the
componentto sustainthe load conditions and to assureallowable stressintensifiesare not
exceeded.Repairor refurbishmentmaybecomeanecessityatthispoint. Theextentof analysis
and testingperformedwill dependon theimportanceof the system,its locationwith respectto
populatedfacilities, and the overall required level of safety. A cost-benefit study may be
required prior to additional repair, refurbishment, or replacement.
4.3.3 Design Verification Checklists
KHB 1710.15 requires that all systems be reviewed against the requirements in the KSC
design standards. In KSC-STD-Z-0005, the piping for pneumatic systems is required to be
designed to meet the guidelines in ASME B31.3, Chemical Plant and Petroleum Refinery Piping
Code. ASME B31.3 provides detailed guidelines for the design and installation of piping,
components, and supports.
Design verification checklists provide a systematic method of reviewing a system for
compliance with design requirements. See Appendix B for a sample checklist which can be used
to verify compliance with KSC-STD-Z-0005. Similar checklists should be prepared and used to
verify compliance with other KSC design standards (KSC-STD-Z-0006, -0007, -0008, -0009, -
0010). Checklists should remain current and incorporate the latest changes to these standards.
Systems whose baseline review was to checklists developed for earlier revisions are suitable for
continued operation. However, new systems and modifications to systems are to be designed and
reviewed to the most current document.
4.4 Additional Engineering Analysis
As the certification of PV/S at KSC continues, specific discrepancies arise that warrant
additional engineering analyses. This section contains a brief description of several concerns and
the resulting engineering analyses which are generally applicable to all KSC vessels and systems.
4.4.1 Flanges Designed to ASME/ANSI B!6.5
Standard flange designs currently used have been around for many years, with operating
experience in a wide variety of services. The original designs of ASME/ASNI B16.5, Pipe
Flanges, and Flanged Fittings were based on the operating history of the flanges, with little
correlation to material properties. In the early 1970's, a revision to B16.5 was made that directly
correlated material properties to rated pressures. The standard was not accepted nor used by the
industry. However, in 1979 a revised B16.5 was issued. The revision used operating history to
establish rated pressures for flanges made out of ASTM A105 material, which is the
representative steel for material group 1.1, as identified in B16.5. All other pressure ratings were
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basedon a comparison of material properties with those of ASTM A105. This comparison for
establishing rated pressures for various material groups and for various temperature ranges up to
800°F was based on the methods found in Annex D of B16.5.
A question presented early in the certification program at KSC was how to rate flanges
that meet ASME/ANSI dimensional standards fabricated of material specifically addressed in
B16.5. The particular case involved flanges on the nozzles of vessels manufactured by A.O.
Smith with a design pressure of 6600 psig. The flange dimensions are the same as a standard
Class 2500, l-1/2-inch flange, including the number of bolt holes, flange thicknesses, and
diameters. However, the flanges are made of A.O. Smith specification 5002 Modified; a non-
ASME specified material.
After discussing the question with several flange manufacturers and the Chairman of
ASME/ANSI B16.5, the consensus was that there should be no concern. To determine the rated
pressure for the flange, simply apply the rules in Annex D of B16.5. The A.O. Smith flange has
a higher yield strength than AI05 material. Thus, according to D2.2 (4), the selected stress, S1,
is based on one of several options, but can be no higher than the minimum value for any material
listed in a given material group. However, for temperatures less than 500°F, Group 1.2 is to be
used. Thus, from Table 1D of B16.5, the rated pressure for the flange is 6250 psig for ambient
temperatures. The vessel, therefore, must be derated to 6250 psig MAWP. Furthermore, the
highest allowable pressure for any Class 2500 ASME/ANSI flange is 6250 psig, which may limit
the operating pressure of systems originally designed for at 6600 psig.
4.4.2 Bolting for ASME/ANSI Flanges
ASME/ANSI B16.5, Section 5.3, provides specific guidelines for bolting in standard
ASME/ANSI flanges. During system walkdowns, a comparison to Table 1B of ASME/ANSI
B16.5 identified bolting not acceptable for use in high pressure flanges. Low strength bolting
(such as A193-B8, Class 1) may only be used in Class 150 or 300 flanges. Table 4-1 lists flange
bolting materials found in use at KSC. Some of the bolting found in Class 2500 and 1500 flanges
at KSC should only have been used in Class 150 or 300 flanges. The low strength bolting
identified is unacceptable and should be replaced with A193-B8 Class 2 bolting, an intermediate
strength stainless steel bolting, rather than high strength carbon steel bolting such as A193 B7,
due to the severe corrosion problems at KSC. However, adequate assembly requirements should
be established to minimize corrosion of the bolting materials. Stress corrosion is a common
failure mode of stainless steel bolts; therefore, type 303 stainless steel bolting should be avoided
because of its susceptibility to stress corrosion in the KSC environment. During system design
walkdowns, all low strength bolting as well as all type 303 stainless steel bolting should be
identified and replaced before the system is certified. All bolting should be reviewed per the
criteria of ASME B31.3, paragraph 309, and appendix A, Table A-2. For example, this review
reveals that A193-B7 bolting may not be used below -20 degrees F unless it has been quenched
and tempered, in which case, it may be used as low as -50 degrees F without impact testing.
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TABLE 4-1 Sample Bolting Materials Found at KSC
SPEC. GRADE MARKING MATL YS TS STRENGTH USES
A193-B7 B7 4140 105K 125K HIGH ANY FLANGE
A193-B6 B6 410 85K IlOK MEDIUM ANY FLANGE
AI93-B80.2 B...88 304 65K 105K MEDIUM ANY FLANGE
A320-B8C C1.2 B8C 347 65K 105K MEDIUM ANY FLANGE
A320-B8M C1.2 B8M2 316 65K 95K MEDIUM ANY FLANGE
A320-B8T C1.2 B8T 321 65K 105K MEDIUM ANY FLANGE
A320-B8F C1.2 B8F 303 65K 105K MEDIUM ANY FLANGE
AI93-B8 CI.1 B8 304 30K 75K LOW CLASS 150/300
A320-B8C CI.I B8C 347 30K 75K LOW CLASS 150/300
A320-B8M CI.1 B8M 316 30K 75K LOW CLASS 150/300
A320-B8T CI.1 B8T 321 30K 75K LOW CLASS 150/300
A320-B8F CI.1 B8F 303 30K 75K LOW CLASS 150/300
4.4.3 Fracture Mechanics
Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics (LEFM) is a method for predicting vessel failure mode
and estimating the remaining cyclic life in components with known defects. Application of
LEFM depends on knowing material property data for the service environment of concern and
is, typically, not supplied by vessel manufacturers. Material data can be found in ASTM
standards for common steel in common environments, but involved literature research is often
required for vessels, due to frequent use of more exotic materials. LEFM can be a useful tool
only if the proper material properties can be determined.
LEFM analysis assumes that any structure has flaws created during fabrication or through
service conditions. The level of stress applied to a given flaw, which would cause it to become
an unstable crack, is sought. Flaw growth through the elastic stress field present at a crack tip
is dependent on both the flaw shape and specific material properties, such as the critical stress
intensity factor (K_).
For this analysis, crack size assumptions and calculations are to be based on NDE
acceptance criteria set by industry codes, actual flaw sizes from NDE, or the maximum stable
crack size under operating stresses at given design temperatures and pressures. Steps for each
portion of an LEFM analysis tend to yield conservative projections for cyclic life. Methodology
is typically based on mono-block vessels of standard construction, but may also be used for
multi-layer type pressure vessels. Cyclic life projections for multi-layer vessels also tend to be
conservative, since normal crack propagation is interrupted at any layer interface in such vessels.
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An LEFM analysiswasperformed,in conjunctionwith otherengineeringanalysisand
NDE, on a bank of vesselsmanufacturedby U.S. Steeland locatedat LaunchComplex36.
During inspectionof theseintegrally forgedvessels,crackswerefound usingmagneticparticle
inspection. One bank of 10vesselswas completelyrefurbishedwith all identified cracks
measuredandgroundout. LEFM wasusedto estimatetheremainingcyclesfor theotherbanks
of vessels. The conservativeanalysisindicateda large numberof cycleswould be required
before theseidentified crackswould fail. Basedon the LEFM analysis,it wasdetermined
refurbishmentandN-DEon theremainingvesselbanks could be performed over a 3-year period.
LEFM was not used to allow indefinite operation, but as a mechanism for justifying the extension
of the refurbishment period.
4.4.4 Vent Line Sizing
The design of vent lines to handle worst case flow rates without significant back pressure
should have been considered in the original, system design. For many systems, verification can
be accomplished at the time of the system field review. Many systems have large diameter, short
vent lines fed only by small lines with low flow rates. Initially then, calculations are not required
for these lines. If a field verification cannot establish the adequacy of the vent lines, then
calculations should be performed. Back pressure and choked flow can be a concern in long vent
lines, and this should be analyzed where appropriate.
Maintaining the rated flow capacity of relief valves is always a prime consideration in the
design of a venting system. ASME Code, Section VIII, requires relief valves be set no higher
than the vessel MAWP or design pressure and reach maximum flow by 110% of the set pressure.
Tolerance on relief valve set pressure is established at plus or minus 3 psi up to 70 psig and plus
or minus 2 percent over 70 psig. Special considerations should be given when two or more relief
valves are connected to the same port.
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SECTION 5. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
DOCUMENTATION ORGANIZATION
5.1 Overview
The certification program configuration management system includes numerous means of
maintaining documentation on PWS. Each PWS must be uniquely identified so documentation
can be easily retrieved. Chapter 4 of KHB 1710.15 identifies the requirements and the level of
detail for PWS certification. A documentation package should be prepared for each PV/S, which
documents the system capability and verifies each PWS is safe for continued operation.
5.2 Marking and Labeling
All PV/S must be labeled in accordance with applicable design, fabrication, and
installation drawings and specifications.
KHB 1710.15, Chapter 4, provides detailed marking/labeling instructions, and requires each
pressure vessel be identified with a brass or stainless steel tag which is permanently affixed as
near as possible to the original manufacturer's nameplate. This tag must bear, as a minimum:
"KSC PV/S CERTIFICATION PROGRAM," "CERTIFIED MAWP xxxx PSI," and "EFFECTIVE
DATE (month/year)," as shown in Figure 5-1. The reason for this tag is that most vessels will
have been rerated to reflect changes in the applicable codes or standards. Many times this rating
will be lower than the original pressure rating. Marking should be done in a way that will allow
easy identification of the information mentioned above.
Each safety-relief valve must be tagged with the relief setting in psi, date calibrated or
set, and due date of next test in accordance with KHB 1710.15. Most relief valves, flex hoses,
and pressure gages at KSC are currently tagged as part of an active recall program, and all
components in the recall program must indicate the next due date. Additional marking/labeling
to enhance identification and operation of the system is not precluded, provided the nomenclature
is consistent with the applicable codes and standards, and allows for component traceability.
FIGURE 5-1 Sample Vessel Identification Tag
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FIGURE 5-2 Sample Relief Valve Tag
5.3 Unique Identification Numbers
All components in pressurized systems must be identified by a unique identifier (Find
Number) traceable to the system mechanical schematic.
5.3.1 Vessel/System Identification
A four part numbering system utilizing the facility numbers fxom the GP-14-2 utilization
charts was developed and used on some PV/S early in the certification program. This numbering
system proved to be unworkable for systems already certified at KSC and is no longer
recommended.
5.4 Drawing Control
Typically, system schematics are controlled documents and are maintained up-m-date.
These drawings should be referenced in a certification package, but are not required to be
maintained in certification fries, since they can easily be retrieved from KSC documentation
centers.
5.5 Certification Package
A certification package is a collection of documentation in various formats that verifies
the capability for continued safe operation of a pressure vessel or system. Each package must
contain sufficient information to verify the safety of the system and components at the certified
pressures. KHB 1710.15, Chapter 4, specifies the documentation required for certifying PV/S.
Additional guidelines on documentation requirements can be found in Section 3 of this guide.
Certification packages are, typically, prepared on a system basis. They should contain all
available information obtained through documentation retrieval, field surveys and engineering
analyses required for certification, and should be maintained on file by the certification
contractor. The package can be divided into seven sections. The recommended minimum outline
for a certification package is as follows:
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FILE SECTION CONTENTS
1 ........... File Content Summary
2 ........... Field Audit Data
3 ........... Documentation Review (e.g., manufacturer data report, drawings)
4 ........... Documentation and Engineering Analysis Results (e.g., calculations)
5 ........... Engineering Work Packages
6 ........... Inspection and Test Results and Analysis
7 ........... Inservice Inspection Plan
The following sections describe each file section of the certification package and the
Certification Report. A certification package should be prepared for each system, where a system
is defined as all piping, vessels, and components operating with the same fluid.
A system may contain any number of vessels and components and should be simplified
where required. For example, this may require a gaseous nitrogen system be divided into several
systems, each at a different operating pressure. Each separate system or division of a system
would then require a separate certification package. To simplify a system, the certification
contractor should use established interface points to eliminate confusion between the operations
and certification identification.
Each certification package should remain current, reflecting the system's configuration,
operation, and certification. As each phase of PV/S certification is completed, each file section
should be reviewed and updated. Hence, it is maintained and becomes a current certification file.
5.5.1 File Content Summary
The File Content Summary should identify the vessel(s) or system involved, the system
fluid, the location, the responsible certification contractor, and O&M contractor, if different.
Additionally, the File Content Summary should identify the location of the system documentation
required for certification, if different from the certification files.
5.5.2 Field Audit Data
The Field Audit Data section identifies the details of the field survey on a particular
system. This section should list all vessels, relief valves, components, and piping in a fashion
thoroughly identifying the capacity, pressure ratings, and manufacturer of each item. Each
certification package is required to contain an accurate inventory list of all system vessels, piping,
and components.
5.5.3 Documentation Review
Documentation is the foundation of the PV/S certification program. Documentation
collection precludes more costly methods of establishing PV/S configuration, specifications, and
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certifications. Collection and review of documentationshould be initiated at the onset of
certificationwork andshouldbepresentedin asthoroughafashionaspossiblein thecertification
package.
The documentationanalysissectionof a certificationpackagedescribesthe findingsof
PV/S documentationanalysis. Report findings should include a detailed inventory of all
documentation readily available, the documentationobtained from other sources, and
documentationrequiring development. Eachcertificationpackageis required to identify all
documentationavailablefor eachvesselandsystemasrequiredby KHB 1710.15,Chapter4.
Copiesof documentationobtainedonvesselsincludingdrawingsandmanufacturer'sdata
reports shouldbe included. KSC controlleddrawings,suchassystemschematics,shouldbe
referenced,but arenot requiredaspart of thecertificationpackage.
Included in the documentationanalysissectionshouldbe an indication that a field
verification of the system supporting documentationhas been performed. All PV/S
documentation is required to be verified through field investigations. All system and component
specific data should be verified to the extent possible through visual surveys.
An optional section in the documentation analysis section is a system description
summary. System descriptions identify the system location; function; pertinent operating
parameters including pressure, contents, relief protection; major components; and materials.
Descriptions can be enhanced by photographs and line drawings, as required.
5.5.4 Documentation and Engineering Analysis Results
Depending on the documentation available for each PV/S, various levels of engineering
analyses may be required. As a minimum, a verification of system design documentation is
required. This verification will assure system and vessel designs are in conformance with the
applicable codes, standards, and industry practice. The design verification process will, typically,
include a special review of documents and the performance of alternate calculations, as necessary,
to assure the design meets the specified criteria.
Visual inspections performed by qualified examiners are required to assure the structural
integrity of all pressure system components. Visual inspection should include all accessible
components and welds for indications of potential failure or degradation such as cracks, flaws,
corrosion, deteriorating pipe supports, pipe flange bolting, brackets, or other physical
deterioration. The results of all visual inspections from the initial inspection and ISI review must
be documented and summarized in the documentation and engineering analysis results section
of each certification package.
Engineering analysis should be performed as necessary for system and vessel design
verification, documentation verification, continued operation and visual inspection results analysis.
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Engineeringanalysistasksconductedprior to issuanceof engineeringwork packagesinclude,as
needed,thefollowing:
Verification of adequatedesignper ASME VesselCode,SectionVIII, Division
1,includingHead,Shell,andNozzleCalculations.
Detailedstressanalysisto demonstratecompliancewith ASME CodeSectionVIII,
Division 2, if a Division 1analysisdoesnot establishthe requiredcertification.
Verification of adequatesystemdesignperKSC designstandards,ASME/ANSI,
and othercodesand standards,includingpipe stressand safetyrelief valve set
point andflow capacitycalculations.
5.5.5 Engineering Work Packages
Documentation required for engineering work packages (EWP's) should be included in
the certification package. Based on the documentation review and engineering analysis report,
the EWP's should clearly and specifically define all required NDE, special tests, and repairs to
ensure the PV/S are in compliance with applicable codes. An EWP is, typically, the set of
documents required to obtain services. A Support Request (SR) is, typically, used for obtaining
NDE support services, while an Engineering Support Request (ESR) is used for other support
services. A sample of an ESR is contained in Appendix C.
Any required actions regarding PV/S monitoring, repair, replacement or modifications to
ensure personnel safety/vessel integrity/and to correct code violations/must be documented.
These actions may include re-analysis of the vessel, vessel repairs, piping systems support
changes, and system operational modifications.
5.5.6 Inspections and Tests Results and Analysis
The implementation of EWP's will generate documentation on inspections and tests. The
results of these examinations, tests, and repairs must be analyzed to ensure they meet all
requirements for PV/S certification. Analysis of the results of the EWPs must be sufficiently
documented to allow verification by independent reviewers. All inspections and tests must meet
the acceptance criteria in accordance with industry standards.
5.5.7 Inservice Inspection Plan
Chapter 7 of KHB 1710.5 discusses the requirements of an Inservice Inspection (ISI) Plan.
Typically, PV/S recertification occurs at a twenty year interval. However, depending on the
results of initial certification program or system hazards, the intervals for continued inspection
may vary. Each system's ISI Plan is unique and is documented in the certification file. The ISI
Plan is developed based on the results of the certification process.
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5.6 Certification Report
For each vessel and system, a certification report is required by KHB 1710.15, Chapter 4.
Each report must describe the steps involved in the certification along with the rationale for
certification. Reports are to be based on all of the results of the inspection, analysis, NDE, etc.,
performed. The length of the certification report will vary, depending upon the results contained
in the other sections. For each system, a certification report must be provided to the KSC
Pressure Systems Manager (PSM) for review and retention.
Since the Certification Report is the only document submitted, it must contain sufficient
detail to justify certification. A sample outline for a Certification Report is shown in Table 5-1.
Included in the Certification Report should be a certification certificate for each PV/S.
As required by KHB 1710.15, Chapter 4, each certificate indicates that the system, its vessels, and
components comply with KHB 1710.15. Each certificate should also indicate those non-safety
related discrepancies that have not been adequately addressed prior to the release of the
certification report. It should be noted that a PWS is not considered certified until all safety-
related hardware discrepancies are corrected.
TABLE 5-1
SECTION 1
SECTION 2
SECTION 3
SECTION 4
SECTION 5
(continued)
Sample Outline for a Certification Report
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION: Identifying the major components and briefly
describing the operation and configuration of the system. Photographs and
drawings are used as required. System end-points should be clearly def'med.
DOCUMENTATION SUMMARY: Describing the documentation available,
identifying nomenclature such as rifle, drawing number, etc., its location, and
identifying significant discrepancies.
DESIGN VERIFICATION RESULTS: Describing the system and vessel
design verification effort, identifying applicable codes and standards, input
data, and significant findings.
ENGINEERING WORK PACKAGES: Describing documentation issued for
inspection and tests, and repairs and modifications required for PV/S
certification.
INSPECTION AND TEST RESULTS: Providing a summary of the tests
and nondestructive examinations performed, including visual inspections.
Unacceptable results should be described in detail.
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TABLE 5-1 (continued) Sample Outline for a Certification Report
SECTION 6
SECTION 7
SECTION 8
SECTION 9
SECTION 10
ENGINEERING ANALYSIS: Summarizing all significant engineering
analysis performed including results of calculations, analysis of inspection
results, and special engineering analysis performed.
CERTIFICATION SUMMARY: Providing a complete summary of the
PV/S certification effort and the final disposition of the system and
components (e.g., certify, rerate, replace, remove from service, etc.)
INSERVICE INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS: Identifying the 20 year
Inservice Inspection (ISI) Plan, including inspection/tests to be performed,
and the frequency, for the system and individual components. ISI guidelines
are established in NHB 1700.6. A discussion of the purpose and extent of
inspections identified should also be provided.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Providing recommendations on future system
operation, inservice inspection, preventive maintenance, and recertification
based on the performance of the certification program.
CERTIFICATION CERTIFICATE: Indicating that system and vessel(s)
comply with KHB 1710.15 except for non-safety-related discrepancies
identified in the certification report. PV/S are not considered certified until
all safety-related hardware discrepancies are corrected. The most common
safety-related discrepancy is improperly set and/or under-sized relief devices.
See KHB 1710.15, Chapter 5, paragraph 500.5 for how to address safety-
related discrepancies which are identified after the PWS have been certified.
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SECTION 6. CERTIFICATION INSPECTION
6.1 Overview
Certification Inspection defines the nondestructive evaluation (NDE), inspection, and tests
necessary for certification of PV/S. The results of the NDE, inspection, and tests completed,
combined with documentation and engineering analysis, provide the basis for future Inservice
Inspections (ISI). Inspection is based on the results of an engineering evaluation of
documentation, engineering analysis of the system and component design and, most importantly,
an understanding of the failure modes which are specific to each respective system and
component. Inspections and tests can then be selected which will best identify indications of the
predicted failure mode. Further, all NDE techniques cannot be universally applied and, in fact,
may be limited by specific material types, vessel designs, etc. As a result, certification inspection
requires an understanding of the various NDE techniques and their limitations, on a system-by-
system and component-by-component basis. Inspections should be planned and coordinat&l with
facility O&M personnel to minimize outages and user impacts.
6.2 Inspections and Tests
6.2.1 Visual Examination
In accordance with KHB 1710.15, the minimum inspection/test to be performed is a visual
external examination of all PV/S piping and components. This requires an examination of the
exterior surfaces of all pressure retaining vessels/components and supports for evidence of
deterioration, including physical damage, excessive corrosion, and cracks. Visual examination
should be performed by qualified and certified visual examiners.
ASME B&PV Code, Section V, identifies visual examination requirements and is used
as the basis for visual examination procedures. Signed visual examination records are to become
a part of the PWS documentation package.
A distinction is made between visual inspections performed to detect evidence of
component failure (e.g., cracks, flaws, corrosion) and the visual inspection required to verify a
system/component's design, documentation, configuration, nameplate, and tag or label data.
Visual inspections required to perform the latter are herein referred to as field surveys, visual
surveys, or visual verifications, and are described elsewhere. In several cases, the performance
of a visual external examination may be impeded by paint, insulation, or limited visual access.
In general, paint need not be removed for an examination of parent metal. Paint may be
removed, however, if the general condition of weld areas cannot be established due to excessive
paint, and in areas where a deteriorated condition is suspected.
In cases where insulation covers surfaces to be inspected, it should be removed, if of the
removable type. If the insulation cannot be readily removed, then a spot- check of the surface
is recommended and should be performed by removing portions of insulation f_om low areas
6-1
(undervessels,etc.),crevices,andotherareaswith thegreatestpotentialfor surfacecorrosionor
stresscorrosioncracking. Thespot-checkexternalexaminationshouldbesupportedwith avisual
internalexamination.
In caseof limited visual access, as with tightly packed vessel banks or arrays, a visual
examination is to be performed to the maximum practical extent, without disassembly. If generic
failure characteristics are suspected, a representative vessel bank can be disassembled and
thoroughly inspected. Further, limited visual examinations may be supported with a pressure test
and acoustic emissions monitoring.
6.2.2 Ultrasonic Thickness Measurements
Ultrasonic thickness measurements are recommended on vessels and piping walls to verify
certification documentation and to support the analysis for pressure retaining capacity. In
general, spot-checks should be performed on at least three locations on each pressure vessel head,
three on the vessel wall, and at two locations for each discrete piping/tubing assembly (i.e., each
piping/tubing section between welded or fitted joints).
Additional measurements or a complete thickness mapping may be required ff internal
corrosion is suspected. Thickness measurements can be readily obtained using ultrasonic
equipment with digital display employing pulse-echo capabilities and a calibration block of
appropriate thickness and material grouping.
6.2.3 Other Nondestructive Evaluations (NDE's)
Other NDE techniques are to be used to supplement existing documentation, engineering
analysis results, and visual examination results, as required, to establish an adequate database for
certification and assure the integrity of the PV/S. Additionally, these NDE techniques are,
typically, relied upon for the long-term ISI planning and implementation. NDE's available
include acoustic emission (AET), liquid penetrant (PT), magnetic particle (MT), radiographic
(RT), ultrasonic (UT) and replication. A pressure test may be required to assess stress corrosion
cracking following other NDE examination which identifies severe surface or crevice corrosion.
Typical examinations and tests performed in accordance with ASTM or ASME B&PV Code
Section V are summarized below:
Acoustic Emission Testing (AET)
Evaluates a pressure vessel's structural integrity by detecting, locating, and
classifying emission sources (i.e., active vessel defects while the vessel is in a
stressed condition). Pressure vessels are stressed by the application of internal
pressure during AET. While currently not being used at KSC, other NASA
centers have had success in using AET when supplemented with follow-up NDE
to completely characterize an emission source.
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Liquid Dye Penetrant Examination (PT)
Detects discontinuity and defects open to the surface in solid, nonporous materials.
The solvent-removable PT method using visible dye is, typically, used for field
testing.
Magnetic Particle Examination (NIT)
Detects surface and near-surface discontinuities or defects in ferromagnetic
materials. The yoke method of MT examination with dry-type magnetic particles
is, typically, used for field testing.
Radiographic Volumetric Examination (RT)
Detects internal defects and variations including porosity, inclusions, cracks, lack
of fusion, geometric variations, and corrosion thinning within a metal volume.
Ultrasonic Volumetric Examination (UT)
Detects lack of weld fusion, cracks, porosity, and other vessel defects, typically
in the weld volume. Geometry and the physical properties of material may affect
the technique prescribed and results.
Replication
A field metallography technique which involves the polishing of a metal and the
use of softened acetate film to reproduce grain structures. Replication can show
the effects of welding at the heat effected zone, Alpha-Beta compositions of the
material, hydrogen embrittlement, and creep damage.
In general, NDE's, including visual examinations, should only be performed by those
persons holding a valid certificate in their respective fields of expertise.
6.3 Inspection Planning
Inspection planning requires (1) the selection of inspections and tests necessary to establish
the PV/S integrity and certification, (2) a field review of PV/S inspectability, (3) development
of an inspection and test schedule compatible with PV/S operation, and (4) development of
engineering work packages for implementing the inspection and tests.
As discussed, the selection of inspections and tests is based on an evaluation of
documentation, engineering analysis, and visual examination results. Following this initial
evaluation, additional NDE's may be necessary and scheduled with an ISI review of the pressure
systems and vessels. This review will establish the inspectability of each system/component for
the additional inspection requirements. This is an important step in inspection planning, since
it will identify inspections and tests which may be impractical due to system requirements, cost,
or incompatibilities, and may. result in the establishment of alternate testing techniques. The
review will account for such concerns as PV/S contents, service, cost, and age. Further, the
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review should identify specific requirements to be incorporated into the engineering work
package, including accessibility, special equipment, cleaning requirements, special test concerns
(e.g., system isolation]deprcssurization, valve and piping alignment), and safety concerns. An
inspection planning memorandum, as shown in Appendix C, can be used to record the results of
a field review and serve as the basis for the development of engineering work packages.
6.4 Other NDE Concerns
As the certification of PV/S at KSC continues, specific discrepancies may arise which
warrant further documentation. This section contains a brief description of the problems and the
additional NDE's required to certify vessels and systems.
6.4.1 Flaw Detection of Full Penetration Welds
Many of the pressure vessels at KSC were designed and built with full penetration welds,
either at the head-to-nozzle junction, head-to-shell junction, or between two shell sections. These
welded joints are, historically, the areas in the vessel most likely to fail. In addition, many of
these vessels can only be certified to their original design pressure by using the requirements of
Section VIII, Division 2. A lengthy and involved re-rate program may be initiated ff more
-. pressure is required; however, a re-rate should be performed as established by the National
Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors (NBBI). Section vm, Division 2 requires that
all butt-welds in monoblock vessels be volumetrically inspected. Some girth-welds for layered
vessels may be excluded.
As a result of these constraints, many vessels require NDE to determine the integrity of
all full-penetration welds. The required NDE can either be ultrasonic flaw detection or
radiography, depending on the weld and vessel geometry. Either method is acceptable as long
as assurance of the quality of the entire weld is provided.
6.4.2 Corrosion Control
Due to the marine environment at KSC, all systems exposed to the weather are susceptible
to corrosion. As a result, many systems have some degree of degradation due to corrosion.
When corrosion is found, an assessment is required to determine the severity and the required
corrective action. As a minimum, the corrosion needs to be controlled by cleaning the areas and
repainting the affected area in accordance with KSC-STD-C-0001. Additional NDE and
engineering analysis may, be required to ensure the corrosion does not jeopardize the integrity of
the system or vessel.
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SECTION 7. INSERVICE INSPECTION PLANNING
7.1 Overview
This section discusses a successful Inservice Inspection (ISI) plan applicable to ground-
based pressure vessels and systems (PV/S) at Kennedy Space Center. The goal of this ISI plan
is to provide a reasonable level of certainty that pressure vessels, piping, and components that
have been certified for their intended service do not degrade with use to the point of becoming
unsafe to personnel and surrounding property. A comprehensive ISI program is an integral part
of the overall certification effort and, typically, involves minimal capital commitment to obtain
the assurance that critical components serve a long life. Development of the ISI plan should be
based on the guidelines established in NHB 1700.6, "Guide for lnservice Inspection of Ground-
Based Pressure Vessels and Systems," which describes, along with KHB 1710.15, systems which
do not fall under the guidelines discussed herein.
7.2 Inspection Requirements
The specific examinations performed during periodic ISI should be determined from the
information available from several sources. The existing certification package should be
reviewed to determine if any specific concerns were raised during the certification analysis of the
PV/S. Nozzles of some pressure vessels may have particularly high stresses (although less than
the allowable stress) or the operating conditions the vessel or piping undergoes may give rise to
concern over a potential fatigue problem. A particular run of piping may have inherent dynamic
instability or areas of high stress concentration. Pressure vessel welds may have been found
faulted at the time of volumetric inspection but, by analysis, rapid flaw growth is not anticipated.
All of these items should be given due consideration by the engineer preparing the ISI
requirements for a given vessel or system.
In addition to consideration being given to potential causes or sites of failure, the
consequence of a given failure should also be taken into account and used in establishing the
required inspections. The fact that a vessel contains a particularly hazardous or lethal commodity
or is located such that its failure would endanger personnel or critical facilities or equipment
should influence the engineer in selecting the frequency and type of examination. Conversely,
if a vessel contains a rather harmless commodity and is not located in an area frequented by
personnel, the engineer may decide on a less comprehensive inspection than if the vessel posed
a risk to personnel (i.e., high pressure water located at a remote site).
Therefore, some of the factors that should influence the engineer's selection of periodic
inspection techniques include: (1) concerns raised during the Phase I certification analysis, (2) the
effects on personnel of failure of PV/S, and (3) the effects on facilities or equipment of a failure
of PV/S. These factors and others determine the appropriate level of NDE to be employed. For
example, a vessel considered to be of critical importance as discussed above could receive
extensive volumetric examination (radiography, UT shear wave), while an identical vessel in a
less critical application might require only routine surface examination (visual inspection, etc.).
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Although the implication here is that ISI is unique to each system, many systems at KSC
fall into very similar categories. For example, two gaseous nitrogen systems at LC-39 having
the same or similar service histories could have identical ISI programs. Care is required in
applying these generic guidelines to ISI, so that system-specific concerns identified for individual
components are not overlooked.
7.3 Establishing Intervals of Inspections
Chapter 6 of NHB 1700.6 provides very structured guidelines for determining the
frequency of ISI on PV/S. A quantitative method of assessing the destructive potential of the
pressure system is employed, with consideration being given to the commodity being stored, as
discussed above. This quantitative method uses "value units" to assess the destructive potential
of the system. The more dangerous commodities are allowed fewer "value units" for a given
inspection interval.
The Tables given in Chapter 6 of NHB 1700.6 are organized by the commodity contained
in the pressure system. In the course of reviewing a system to establish the proper ISI intervals,
individual parts of the system such as pressure vessels, piping and components, expansion joints
and flex hoses, and relief valves are considered as if they were separate entities. Each system
component category uses a different method of computing "value units."
The Tables given in Chapter 6 of NHB 1700.6 imply ideal, static conditions for the
systems under consideration. However, NHB 1700.6 does recommend the pressure system
engineer preparing the ISI guidelines be cognizant of the fact conditions may exist which make
it prudent to modify these Tables. Such conditions include fatigue, corrosion and erosion,
proximity of personnel, and issues raised during the certification analysis of the PWS as
discussed in Section 7.2. All of these considerations can potentially modify the baseline intervals
established in the Tables.
7.4 Implementation Into Maintenance Documents
Performance of periodic maintenance on PV/S is an integral part of facility operation
activities at KSC. Certain Operating and Maintenance Instructions (OMI's) Preventive
Maintenance Instructions (PMI's) or Operating and Maintenance Requirements Specification
Documents (OMRSD's) can be considered part of the ISI program. For example, changing a
relief valve as a maintenance procedure can also be considered one of the items of an ISI
program, and should be documented as such. A coordinated approach to both routine
maintenance and ISI is the most cost-effective method of ensuring component integrity and
safety. However, unique components or system concerns not identified by existing OMI's/PMI's
should have separate documentation written and incorporated into the specified ISI programs to
ensure complete system integrity.
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7.5 Continuous NDE Monitoring of Flaws
Certain types of flaws, which are typically caused during the initial fabrication of a vessel,
may require periodic monitoring throughout the life of the vessel to ensure integrity. Weld flaws,
which include lack of fusion, slag inclusions, and porosity, would have been rejectable at the time
of original fabrication but may not have been detected due to the level of examination employed.
If repair is not immediately mandated, then periodic monitoring of the flaw is prudent to ensure
it does not propagate and cause a failure of the vessel. The interval and level of examination
applied to a flaw should be such that the flaw geometry can be characterized accurately and
monitored to assure it is not growing.
The inspection interval required for a given flaw depends on the location of the flaw, flaw
geometry, type of flaw, and material properties. Flaws with geometries conducive to stress
concentration that are located in high stress areas are of greater concern than small flaws having
no stress risers in low stress areas.
7.6 Evaluate ISI Results With Baseline Inspections
The results of periodic ISI must be compared to the baseline inspection for a given vessel
to determine if any changes in vessel integrity have occurred. The baseline for any vessel is
determined during the original certification analysis and establishes a datum for documentation,
modification, and cyclic history of the vessel. Comparing the results of periodic inspections with
the vessel baseline is particularly important when evaluating known flaws, as discussed in Section
7.5.
If an existing flaw is discovered to be propagating, it must be repaired. The criticality
of the repair is determined by several factors. A conservative fracture mechanics analysis (see
Section 4.3.2) can be used to determine the number of operating cycles remaining. It must be
emphasized that this technique is to be employed very conservatively. If the fracture mechanics
analysis indicates the vessel has few remaining cycles, the flaw should be repaired immediately
or the vessel should be taken out of service. If the analysis indicates many remaining cycles, the
repair could be delayed; however, inspections should be made more frequently to ensure the
actual propagation of the flaw is, in fact, within reason of what was calculated. There may be
other considerations, such as economic, in determining whether to repair a flaw.
7.7 Update of Certification Reports
Based on the evaluation of ISI results, as discussed in Sections 7.5 and 7.6, each
certification report should be re-examined and updated as necessary so that future inspections can
be properly evaluated. The vessel baseline, as established in Section 2.2, must be kept up to date
so future inspections can be accurately interpreted.
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SECTION 8. CERTIFICATION OPTIONS
8.1 Overview
Where the pressure vessel MAWP or system design pressure does not meet the
ASME/ANSI code requirements, it may be necessary to derate or lower the vessel/system
operating pressure. When this option is considered, the user minimum requirements will dictate
the feasibility of this approach. An analysis of required flow rates, pressure levels, and storage
capacity must be performed and evaluated, while keeping in mind certification is intended to
reduce the possibility of unsafe conditions. During system and design reviews many
discrepancies may be identified. Some of these items will have a direct impact on system safety
while other items are required to conform to KSC design standards. Safety-related items, such
as incorrect relief valve settings/flow capacity, must be corrected before certification can be
complete. Non-safety-related items, such as labeling, tagging, and drawing changes may not
necessarily have to be completed in order to certify a system; however, these items must be
tracked until they are properly dispositioned.
A request for waiver/deviation/variance, with associated justification, can be submitted
when it is necessary to continue to operate an existing system after it has been determined that
it cannot be certified. An approved waiver/deviation/variance will become a part of the
system/vessel data package. A request for waiver/deviation/variance should be prepared using
the Deviation/Waiver/Variance Request, KSC Form 20-168. A sample form is included in
Appendix C.
8.2 Typical Certification Scenarios
As the certification of PV/S at KSC continues, specific scenarios are emerging for
certifying PV/S. This section contains a brief description of the problems encountered while
certifying various systems at KSC. These approaches to certification can be applied to other
similar systems.
8.2.1 U.S. Steel Vessels at Launch Complex 36
Eighty-four vessels at Launch Complex 36 were manufactured by U.S. Steel (now CP
Industries) using an integrally forged fabrication method. The vessels were built in 1964 for
gaseous service. They carry ASME "U" Stamps on their heads and were designed for a MAWP
of 6000 psig at -20 to 200°F, per Code Case 1205. The vessels are mounted horizontally and
have a combined water volume of 1680 cubic feet. The visual examination of these vessels
indicated excessive corrosion near the vessel supports. These vessels support key launch
operations for the Atlas Centaur vehicle and cannot be removed from service for lengthy
intervals. In order to assess the structural integrity and extent of the corrosion, one bank of ten
vessels was removed, disassembled, sandblasted, and inspected. The corrosion was determined
to be mostly on the saddles with minimal degradation of the vessels. Magnetic particle
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examinationwasperformedon 100%of thevesselsto determineif crackingwasoccurringdue
to thecorrosion. Thecorrosionwasdeterminednot detrimentalto operationbut did necessitate
refurbishmentto preventfurther degradation.Furthermore,numerouslinear indicationswere
found on thevessel'ssurfaces.
The magneticparticle linear indicationsweredeterminedto beunacceptable;thus,each
indication was removed by mechanical grinding. Only one indication required grinding below
the minimum wall thickness. U.S. Steel Specification CP-E-1218 was followed during the
removal of this indication. This method of crack removal, used by U.S. Steel for all forged
vessels when they are manufactured, allows grinding below minimum wall thickness, providing
the wall thickness surrounding the grind area is sufficiently thicker than minimum wall to provide
adequate reinforcement. Figure 8-1 illustrates the methodology used. Complete thickness
measurements of each indication were obtained. Each vessel was then painted and reassembled.
MAKE WALL MEASUREMENTS AT THESE THREE CIRCUMFERENCES
314' (APPROX.) CENTERS AREA OF REINFORCEMENT
._ tmm - lEAST WALL
_ ,.I>'-" _ _ ...tI"_ -" THICKNESS IN GRIND AREA
B
R __ O.D. OF FINISHED GRIND AREA
h O.D. OF AREA OF REINFORCEMENT
FIGURE 8-1 Removal of Cracks by Grinding (FROM U.S. STEEL SPEC.: CP-E-1218)
The inspection of this representative bottle bank revealed two problems that had to be
corrected. The corrosion had to be stopped, which required all of the bottle banks to be
disassembled, sandblasted, and repainted. Magnetic particle examination needed to be performed
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on all vesselsand all linear indicationsneededto be groundout. Basedon a conservative
fracturemechanicsanalysis,thesevesselscan undergoseveralthousandfull pressurecycles
before the worst casecrack will grow large enoughto causevesselfailure. Basedon this
analysis,thesystemswerecertifiedfor threeyears,duringwhich time theremaining74vessels
wereto be refurbishedor removedfrom service.
In 1989, the remaining vessel dusters were removed from service,disassembled,
sandblasted,tested,paintedandreassembled.Testresultsweresimilar to thoseof thetestgroup,
where localizedcorrosionwasfound with linearindicationsat randomlocationson thevessels.
This programresultedin 83vesselsbeingrecertifiedfor atwenty-yearISI cycle. Onevesselwas
removedfrom servicedue to anunacceptablecrack in thevesselwall.
8.2.2 U.S. Steel Vessels at Launch Complex 17
Two gaseous storage systems consisting of 64 pressure vessels were in service at Launch
Complex 17. The vessels were mounted horizontally in clusters of eight. The vessels were
originally designed and built in 1960 for 2800 psig gaseous oxygen storage at a Titan missile site.
However, they were being used in gaseous nitrogen and helium storage at LC-17 operating at
2250 psig. The total sixty-four vessel battery water volume was approximately 2390 cubic feet.
The vessel construction and material type were similar to ASME code stamped vessels built per
ASME Code Case 1205, with the exceptions of the support bands welded to the vessels and an
allowable stress value of 1/2 of the material yield strength, rather than 1/3 of the material
ultimate strength as specified in Code Case 1205. Obviously, the vessels were not ASME Code
stamped. The vessels were 24 inches outside diameter, had a minimum design wall thickness
of 0.817 inches, and an overall length of 21 feet 5-1/2 inches (nozzle-end to nozzle-end).
Numerous concerns were identified during the inspection and test portion of Phase I. The
primary concerns were (1) the condition of the vessel wall where the support rings were welded
to the shell and (2) the corrosion evident on the majority of vessels. A representative bank of
vessels was removed and two vessels were removed from the bank for further testing. The
testing performed consisted of--
100% visual examination of the entire outer surface of two vessels after
sandblasting
100% magnetic particle examination (MT) of the entire outer surface of two
vessels
Ultrasonic volumetric examination (UT) of the support ring weld areas on two
vessels
Ultrasonic depth measurement of sample MT findings on two vessels
Acoustic emission testing (AET) of one vessel
Hydrostatic testing of one vessel to failure
Metallurgical evaluation of one vessel
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The integrity of the welded support ring was thoroughly testedfor the one vessel
analyzed. The results indicatedvery favorablematerialpropertiesin the basemetal and heat
affectedzone.
The surfacecorrosionwasuniform pitting with negligible lossof vesselwall material.
The corrosionareasdid not showsignsof intergranularor acceleratedattack.
Over 200 unacceptable linear indications were found on each vessel using MT, and
numerous unacceptable indications were found using ultrasonic shear wave on the weld support
tings. Samples of the 200 indications from MT were polished and inspected. The indications
were determined to be surface deformities not detrimental to the vessel. Hence, the majority of
the MT indications were considered non-relevant. The indications in the weld region were
determined to be reflections from the support attachment design, thus were acceptable.
The two vessels were then shipped to White Sands Test Facility, New Mexico, for
destructive testing. One vessel was supported vertically, filled with water and pressurized (the
other vessel was not pressure tested).
An tgET did not indicate any active flaws in the vessel during testing to 2800 psig. The
vessel was then pressurized to 9680 psig where failure occurred. No significant AET activity
was noted. The flaw in the vessel shell where failure occurred was 2-1/2" long by 0.4" deep.
This flaw showed no measurable cyclic growth.
Failure from the destructive test was at a flaw that was "most likely formed during the
manufacturing process." Thus, the remaining vessels were assumed to have similar flaws of
unknown size. Estimates of the flaw sizes were made using fracture mechanics, cyclic data, and
the manufacturer's hydrostatic test pressure data. The fracture toughness values estimated from
the burst test were used to estimate a conservative fracture toughness value. Using this data
indicated the flaws in the vessel could have been as large as through-waU before they reached
critical flaw size. The material fracture toughness value was calculated based on the loads at the
time of failure. This approach indicated a leak-before-burst failure mode, but could not
accurately predict flaw sizes in the remaining vessels; hence, the probability of failure could not
be accurately estimated.
Certification of these vessels based on the analysis and data available was not possible.
Each vessel could have been inspected to assure the user of the integrity of each vessel until a
complete volumetric inspection of each vessel was conducted, but adequate safety margins to
facilities and personnel could not be guaranteed. Therefore, these vessels were removed from
service.
8.2.3 Taylor Forge Banded Vessels
In the late 1950's and early 1960's, Taylor Forge developed and produced a particular
type of vessel known as an "autofxettage" vessel or "banded" vessel. This type of construction
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is not currentlyusedby TaylorForge. Vesselsof thisdesignarefoundat KSC in the Industrial
Area,PropellantSystemsCleaningLaborabory(PSCL),andFuelFarm1. It is importantto note
thesevesselsarenot ASME Codestampedbutbuilt in accordancewith TaylorForgeproprietary
manufacturingproceduresandsomeaspectsof the ASME Boiler andPressureVesselCode.
Theautofrettagedvessel,asproducedbyTaylorForge,consistedof apressure-containing
innercylindricalvesselwith hemisphericalendclosuresandwith abuttingcylindrical reinforcing
bandsandendtings on theoutsideof the innervessel.Thesevesselsweredesignedsotheinner
vesselcardedthecompleteaxialor longitudinalpressureloadandtheouterbandsreinforcedthe
vesselcircumferentially. In orderfor thebandsandendringsto serveaseffectivereinforcement,
theyhadto beof higherstrengthmaterialthantheinnervessel,andhadto bein effectivecontact
with the innervessel.
After fabricating the inner cylindrical vessel,Taylor Forgeplacedthe higher strength
cylindrical outer bandsand end rings over the inner vessel. The outer bandshad an inside
diameterapproximately1%to 1-1/2%greaterthantheoutsidediameterof theinnervessel,while
the end rings were taperedto matchthe inside diameterof the outerbandsand the outside
diameterof the innervesselat thehead-to-shelljoint. Thispermittedtheouterbandsto befreely
installedover the inner cylinderwithout interferencebeforetheendrings wereinstalled.
Oncethe outer bandsand end tings were installed,the inner vesselwas subjectedto
hydrostaticpressuresufficient to plastically flow or yield the inner vesselin a circumferential
directionuntil contactwith theouterbandshadbeenachieved.Thehydrostaticpressurewasthen
increasedfurther until theouterbandsandendrings wereelasticallystressed.The hydrostatic
pressurewas,typically, limited to a level whichwould not allow the stressin thevesselheads,
or the axial stressin the inner shell,to exceed90% of the yield strength. Having reachedthis
stresscondition,thehydrostaticpressurewasreleasedandboth theinnerandouterlayerssprang
backelastically,remainingin contact,with aresidualtensilestressin theouterbandsandresidual
compressivestressin the inner shell.
Generally,the innervesselwasfabricatedcompletewith heads,nozzles,manways,etc.,
with completeradiographyof thefull penetrationwelds. After theinnervesselwascompleteand
all NDE testshad beenperformed,it was stressrelieved in an enclosedfurnace prior to
installationof theouterbandsandendrings.
Typically, the outerbandsand two narrowerendrings weremanufacturedusingrolled
plate and weld fabricationtechniques.Eachband/endring washeattreatedafter welding and
alsoNDE tested. Eachof thebandswasslid intoplaceoverthe innervessel,thenthe two end
rings were installedon the innervesselnearthe head/shellgirth weld. The outer bandswere
madetight by hydraulicexpansionof the innershell (autofrettagexpansionprocess).Tightness
betweenthe two shell layerswas demonstratedby the increaseof circumferenceof the outer
bands measuredwith strain gages. Upon releaseof pressure,the two layers sprangback
elasticallyinto a prestressedcondition,theouterlayer beingin tension,andthe inner layer in
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compression(in the circumferentialdirection). When pressureis reapplied,the two layers
function asanelasticunit up to thepreviouslyappliedautofrettagepressure.
For many of the vessels of this design, Taylor Forge used nickel-modified SA-302B
material. Recorded ultimate tensile strength values, after the chemical modification and heat
treatment listed by Taylor Forge are, typically, 95 ksi for the inner shell and 115 ksi for the outer
bands and end rings. Charpy impact data after strain provided by Taylor Forge shows a slight
decrease in ductility; however, in all cases, the Nil-Ductility zone is to the left of the zero degree
Fahrenheit mark. Therefore, ductile material properties are expected for these vessels over the
operating temperature range at KSC.
8.3 Cryogenic Systems
All components used in cryogenic systems should be designed to operate at the normal
boiling point temperature of the cryogenic system in which they are installed. The components
should be fabricated from type 304/304L, 316/316L stainless steel or other compatible materials.
Components installed in VJ transfer piping should be vacuum jacketed and mate with the transfer
piping inner and outer pipe sizes. Where the vacuum annulus of the component is separate from
that of the piping to which it is attached, there should be a separate pump-out and relief port.
8.3.1 Cryogenic Storage Vessels
Three major factors should be considered regarding the inspection/testing methodology
for ensuring the integrity of cryogenic storage vessels. First, since the space between the inner
and outer vessels is either evacuated or maintained at a slight positive pressure with a dry inert
gas, and the inner vessel is constructed of corrosion resistant material, corrosion and stress
corrosion are not significant mechanisms for failure of the inner vessel. Second, for the materials
used to fabricate cryogenic inner vessels and their supports, studies have shown that crack
propagation characteristics are such that detectable leakage will occur prior to vessel failure.
Finally, periodic pneumatic or hydrostatic pressure testing is not an effective means of detecting
leaks for cryogenic vessels in continuous service, and could even be detrimental for stainless steel
inner vessels. Hydrostatic retests are impractical due to the large cycle time needed to drain,
warm, test, dry, and re-cool the vessel to cryogenic temperature. Additionally, the weight of
water could impose adverse loadings on the support systems for certain vessel (i.e., LH2 vessels).
Periodic annulus pressure monitoring provides an excellent check for leaks. Those
cryogenic storage vessels that are in continuous service should be checked for leaks by ensuring
a stable condition exists in the annular space between the vessels. If vacuum cannot be
maintained without continuous pumping, or if venting occurs from the annular space of non-
vacuum jacketed vessels, the source of leakage should be located and corrected. Leakage from
the inner vessel must be corrected and may entail a repair program.
The outer vessel should be periodically inspected and have all corrosion removed and
affected areas repainted.
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Although not necessarilya safetyconcern,excessiveheat gain through the vessel is
undesirablein that increasedevaporationcanoverloadthenormalventing system,resultingin
higher thannormalullagepressures.Also, high heat leakratescanbe costly in termsof lost
commodity. Increasedheatleak canbecausedby lossof annulusvacuum,as well assettling
of the powderedperlite insulation material. Settling of the perlite insulation material is
acceleratedby repeatedchill-down/warm-upcycles. Forthis reason,thenumberof thesecycles
shouldbekept to a minimum. Oncetheintegrity of theannulusis established,acontinuedhigh
heat-leakrate is anindicationthatthePerlitehassettled.A visual inspectionfor externalsurface
condensationor cold spots,anda measurementof boil-off shouldbeperformedfor all cryogenic
vessels.
Thosepressurerelief deviceswhich protect the cryogenicstoragevessel should be
periodicallypressurecheckedand,if necessary,resetto not exceedthevesselMAWP.
8.3.2 Cryogenic Piping
Piping systems for transferring cryogens can be either insulated or uninsulated for liquid
nitrogen (LN2) and liquid oxygen (LO2), depending on operational requirements and the desired
temperature at the use point. Other types of insulation for these cryogens are (1) natural frost
build-up as a result of the cold pipe and moisture in the atmosphere and (2) pre-formed foam
insulation materials installed on the outer surface of the pipe. Although vacuum jacketed (VJ)
pipe may sometimes be used for LN2 and LO2, VJ transfer piping is always used for liquid
hydrogen (LH2) and liquid helium (LHE).
The primary safety concern for cryogenic piping is in identifying those sections of the
piping system which can be isolated with residual cryogens entrapped, thereby causing
overpressurization by vaporization of the trapped liquid cryogen. As part of the initial system
certification inspection, a walkdown of transfer piping must be conducted to identify any
isolatible sections of cryogenic piping which do not incorporate relief device protection. The
intent of this inspection is to ensure an unprotected piping section does not exist. Pressure relief
devices should be periodically tested, and gages should be periodically recalibrated. In addition,
the vacuum jacket annular space should be periodically checked for loss of vacuum or leakage.
As in cryogenic vessels, the vacuum integrity is also important to VJ piping. A relief
device should be installed on the jacket to protect the vacuum annulus from overpressurization
should a leak or rupture occur in the inner pipe. This relief device need not be functionally
checked periodically and should be of simple design, such as a rupture disc or a vacuum retained
plug. The relief device and pumpout port should be protected from physical damage.
8.3.3 Cryogenic Valves and Flexible Hoses
Cryogenic shutoff valves should be designed with an extended bonnet and stem seal to
preclude possible stem leakage. Valves having extended bonnets should be installed
approximately vertical to prevent the cryogen from coming in contact with the stem packing.
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Both gate and ball-type valves should have body cavities vented through a hole in the
downstream gate plate and/or the ball flow cavity.
Flexible hoses for cryogenic service should be fabricated from convoluted stainless steel
materials. Teflon or other non-metallic hose materials are not acceptable for this service.
8.4 Hypergolic Fuel/Oxidizer Systems
Hypergolic fuels and oxidizers are used in launch vehicle and spacecraft propulsion
systems. The GSE storage and transfer systems for these fluids have unique design
considerations. Some of the critical design considerations are toxicity, vapor migration, materials
compatibility, and safe disposal of venting vapor. Both pressure vessels and systems must be
designed for lethal service. (See ASME Code Section VIII, Division 1, Paragraphs UW-2 and
UCI-2; Division 2, Paragraph AG-301.1(c) and ANSI B31.3, Appendix M).
Hypergolic fluid transfer systems should be designed to preclude unnecessary liquid traps
in transfer lines and components. Evaluation of the fluid flow path and passageways in
components assists the designer in selecting suitable components.
Mechanical connections used in transfer system piping should be selected for their proven
performance of no leakage. For example, raised face flanges conforming to ANSI B16.5 should
have concentric serrations in accordance with ANSI MSS-SP-6, as opposed to spiral serrations.
Other mechanical type connections and fittings should be similarly considered to include features
eliminating possible fluid leakage.
Due to the high hazards associated with hypergolic fluids, the system design should
prevent vapor migration of hypergolic fluids into pneumatic supply lines interfacing with fuel or
oxidizer transfer systems. These interfaces should incorporate a hand-operated shutoff valve
upstream of a poppet or cone-type, spring-actuated check valve to permit positive shutoff of the
pneumatic branch and unidirectional pneumatic flow. Pneumatic supply branches should be
designed to interface with only one type of hypergolic fluid (i.e., fuel or oxidizer). See KSC-
STD-Z-0005 for recommended design of pneumatic/hypergol interfaces.
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Requirements Checklist for KSC-STD-Z-0005
PNEUMATIC GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
GENERAL NOTES
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
This document was developed by General Physics Corporation to assist in the evaluation
of pressure systems against the requirements of Standard KSC-STD-Z-0005, Standard for
Design of Pneumatic Ground Support Equipment, as part of the KSC Pressure Vessel and
System Certification Program. This checklist is not intended to be a substitute for current
requirements documents for the design and fabrication of pressure systems. Where
discrepancies occur in the interpretation, the KSC standard takes precedence.
Several specifications and standards documents are referenced by this checklist in addition
to KSC Standard KSC-STD-Z-0005. Use the latest issue (revision) of referenced
documents when completing this checklist.
Each question identified on the checklist should be addressed with a YES, NO, N/A to
be applied as follows:
YES: System/Component(s) meets the requirement.
NO: System/Component(s) do not meet the requirement.
For questions answered "NO" an additional comment sheet should
be attached that specifically identifies the areas of nonconformance.
A recommended resolution should also be provided.
N/A: The requirement does not apply to the system/component(s) design,
type, or configuration.
The system identification number, date, and the checklist reviewers' signature should be
identified on each checklist.
Requirements identified by a (*) require a response when reviewing new (to-be-
fabricated) system designs.
B-2
Requirements Checklist for KSC-STD-Z-0005
PNEUMATIC GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
GENERAL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Identification Number(s)
Service
Spec
Section Requirements
Yes, No
or N/A
ALL SYSTEMS
1.3 Is the pneumatic ground support equipment (GSE) designed in accordance with the provisions end
requirements of KSC-DE-512-SM?
NOTE: In case a conflict between KSC DE-512-SM and KSC-STD-Z-O005,
the requirements of the latter shall take precedence.
3.9
3.16.2
3.17.1
3.17.2
3.22.1
3.24.1
3.24.2
Are all castings subjected to pressure made of ASTM A 351, grade CFsM or grade CFs material*
Is the distribution system grounded and bonded in accordance with KSC-STD-E-O012?
Are distribution plumbing, associated components and mechanical equipment designed to withstand
exposure to KSC environment, or else is it equipped with a special enclosure which is provided with a flow-
through, posilJve-intemal pressure purge in accordance with KSC-STD-E-O002?
Is special enclosure provided for system components designed to perform in the launch environment?
Are the distribution plumbing and components protectad from corrosion deterioration according to KSC-STD-
C-O001 ?
Is the cLstribution system and components that contact GSE fluid media cleaned to the requirements of
KSC-STD-C-0123?
Is the maximum allowable working stress for all components in accordance with ASME Boiler & Pressure
Vessel Code Section VIII (for pressure vessels) and ANSI B31.3 (for piping/tubing, valves, etc.)?
Have all components been hydrostatic/pneumatic tested per these oodes?
Have the distribution system connections been proven to be leaktight as determined by application of MIL-L-
25567 type I or MSFC-SPEC-384 leak test solution?
Are all components and interface connection ports assigned a unique identilication number on engineering
drawings end a tag attached to the component?. (Ref. KSC-GP-435 Vol I.)
Does the face of all operating or control panels have black stripe interconnecting lines to each component
representing the flow path of fluid media?
m
t
NOTE: Comments should be
made on separate sheets for
all questions answered no__
Reviewer's Name:
Date:
Extension:
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Requirements Checklist for KSC-STD-Z-0005
PNEUMATIC GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
GENERAL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Identification Number(s)
Service
Spec
Section Requirements
Yes, NO
or N/A
3.25.3
3.26.2
3.27.1
3.28
Does each Ib_ supply to a multiple fluid system terminate with an isolation valve followed by a check valve
with a _tawe installed between the isolation valve and check valve?
Does the ¢fmldit_tion plumbing system function propertyat _ extremes of the ambient conditions as defined
in KSC-DE-61_M?
Is tempm'alml_condlJoning provided where required?
Are the _ temperatures and their tolerances shown on the mechanical schematic at appropriate
Ioca_onl in alA,,'_._lslomsfor which temperature conditioning is required?
Are hazm_ll _ and failure mode and effects analysis for the distribution system and components in
compliance _"KSC-DE-P-360?
Is the _lity cdteda for the distribution system in compliance with KSC SR73-1020 and has the
maintainS, amalyals been perfurmed in accordance with KSC-DE-512-SM?
m
¢,
t
OXYGEN SYSTEMS ONLY"
Does _¢mj_=sn system and components conform to the requiremente of NFPA No. 50?
Does thellluml_Ag and component material in contact with oxygen, including breathing gas mixtures, satisfy
the requi_ of NHB 8060.1?
3.12.5 Were fast ellmming valves avoided and were non-thmttJing shutoff valves provided with bypass metering
valves?
HYDROGEN SYSTEMS ONLY
3.13.1 Does the D/stmm conform to NFPA No. 50A?
3.13.4 Was p_ t,_ontaining plumbing and component material selected for minimum hydrogen embri_ement
=J._epa=a,p
NOTE: Comments shou_ be
made on separate steers l_r
all questions answered _m.
Reviewer's Name:
Date:
Extension:
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Requirements Checklist for KSC-STD-Z-0005
PNEUMATIC GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
Spec
GENERAL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Identification Number(s)
Service
Yes, No
Section Requirements or WA
NOTE: Auetenitic stainless steel grades TP 304, TP 316 for piping end ASTM A 351 grades,
CF8, CF8M for castings are preferred. Materials that should be avoided include, but are
not limited to, Uranium, maraging steels, 400-series stainless steals, MIL-S-16216,
ASTM A514, ASTM A517, and the steels listed in Section 2.3 of MIL-HDBK-5, end
precipitation hardening stainless steels.
HYPERGOLIC SYSTEM INTERFACES ONLY
3.14.2 Does the interface between the pneumatic distribution plumbing end the hypergolic propellent system meet
the minimum requirement set forth in Section 3.14.2 (parts a-f)?
3.14.3 Does the interface between the pneumatic distribution system and the hypergolic propellant system meet
the op_mum requirements set forth in Section 3.14.3 (parts a-c)?
If either answer isNO go to Section 3.14.4.
3.14.4 If only the minimum requirement set forth in Section 3.14.2 (parts a-f) is met, but not the requirements set
forth in Section 3.14.3 (parts a-c), is the pneumatic system interface with hypergol propellant system
manually operated?
VENT SYSTEMS
3.11.1
3.11.2
Is the cischarging of oxidizers and fuels into the same vent avoided?
Are vent systems handling fuels or oxidizers fluids equipped with a means of diluting the vented fluid end
inerting the vent system with a gas such as nitrogen?
Are oxidizer and fuel vent outlets to the atmosphere separated sufficiently to prevent mixing of vented
fluids?
Are all vent system outlets located such that they are normally inaccessible to personnel and are they
conspicuously identified?
Are vent system outlets protected against rain intrusion end entry of nest building birds, insects, end
animab?
Are all vent outlets designed se as to prevent accumulation o! vented fluid in dangerous concentrations in
areas frequented by unprotected personnel or motor vehicles?
NOTE: Comments should be
made on separate sheets for
all questions answered n...o.o.
Reviewer's Name:
Date:
Extension:
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Requirements Checklist for KSC-STD-Z-0005
PNEUMATIC GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
GENERAL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Identification Number(s)
Service
Spec
Section Requirements
Yes, No
or N/A
3.11.3
3.11.4
Were all systems sized to provide minimum beck-preseure consistent with required venting flow rates?
Are all vent systems designed such that in no case can the back-pressure interfere with the proper operation
of relief devices?
Has a design analysis been performed to ensure excessive back-preseure will not occur in mullJple-use vent
systems?
Is each line venting into a multiple-use vent system protected against beck pressurization by means of a
check valve if the upstream system cannot withstand the beck pressure or where contamination of the
upstream system cannot be tolerated?
TUBING INSTALLATIONS
3.1.1 Am all pressure tubing runs made of seamless, stainless steel tubing that meets the requirements of
3.1.1.1 KSC-SPEC-Z-0007 and are they fabricated and installed per KSC-SPEC-Z-0008?
Are all alternate fittings installed per KSC-STD-Z-0005 Section 3.1.27
Do the tube assemblies meet the minimum straight tube lengths and tube bend dimensions per Tables 1
through 4 of specification KSC-SPEC-Z-0008?
Are tubing bends free of wrinkles, scratches and fiat spots?
Are all bulkhead fittings instelled with the fixed hex outside of panels?
3.1.1.2 Do all flared tube ends have either a 37-degree formed flare or a buttwelded spud containing a machined
37-degree flare for joining tube to threaded Fittings?
Are all tube sizes with wall thickness greater than 0.109 inch fabricated with the buttwelded (spud) flare?
3.1.1.3 Are all threaded and buttwelded fittings limited to tube size from 1/4- to 2qnch outside diameter?
3.1.1.3.1 Do all KC threaded fittings using standard 37-degrae flare ends meet the requirements of KC GP-425 and
were they procured per KC-F-1247
t
m
m
t
m
m
m
NOTE: Comments should be
made on separate sheets for
all questions answered no__
Reviewer's Name:
Date:
Extension:
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Requirements Checklist for KSC-STD-Z-0005
PNEUMATIC GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
Spec
GENERAL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Identification Number(s)
Service
Yes, No
Section Requirements or N/A
3.1.1.3.1.1
3.1.1.3.1.2
3.1.1.3.2
3.1.1.4
3.1.1.5
3.1.2
In all cases where the onginal design drawings do not specify KC fittings, but specify plain-nose 37-degree
flared tube fittings, are the fittings lunctionally equivalent per Table 1 of KSC-STD-Z-O005?
Are all KC fittings limited to a minimum temperature of minus 320 degrees F, and a maximum operating
temperature of 425 degrees F?
Is the standard port design for use with threaded fittings per MS33649 for rated pressures specified in KSC-
SPEC-Z-O008?
Is the super pmssura port design with straight intemal treads used when operating at pressures above the
ratings specified in KSC-SPEC-Z-O008?
NOTE: Existing equipment components that have MC240, AND10049, or AND 10050 ports are
considered acceptable for continued use in the GSE in which they are installed.
Do all buttwelded tube joints utilize only those weld fittings as listed in the table in Section 3.1.1.3.2 of
standard KSC-STD-Z-O005?
For buttwelded spuds (machined flares), are the ends subsequently joined to threaded fittings by using
KC142 coupling nuts?
Are tube and buttwelded fittings joined by Ihe tungsten-inert gas (TIG) welding method acoon:ling to the
requirements of KSC-SPEC-Z-O0167
Are the limitations and procedures for tubing installation of KSC-SPEC-Z,.O007 and KSC-SPEC-Z-O008
followed?
NOTE: Flarelese fittings are prohibited in pneumatic GSE. The use of crush washers in Ilared-
fitting connections is also prohibited. Self flared fittings and brazed fittings shall not be
specified without specific approval from KSC Directorate of Design Engineering.
Threaded fittings listed in GP-425 are limited for use between minus 320 degrees F and
plus 425 degrees F; however, use above 300 degrees F must be with the approval of
Design Engineering.
Have superprassure tubing and fittings been installed per manufacturads instructions?
Q
NOTE: Comments should be
made on separate sheets for
all questions answered n...9.o.
Reviewer's Name:
Date:
Extension:
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Requirements Checklist for KSC-STD-Z-0005
PNEUMATIC GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
GENERAL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Identification Number(s)
Service
Spec
Section Requirements
Yes, No
or N/A
PIPING INSTALLATIONS
8.1.3 NOTE: Bottweided pipe may be used as an alternative for tubing.
3.1.3.1 Were all piping installations designed in accordance with ANSI B31.3?
3.1.3.2 Does pipe material meet either of the following criteria:
a. Stainless steel pipe: seamless, cold-drawn type-316L or type-304L staJnlsss steel per
ASTM A 312 and ANSI B36.10M?
b. Other material approved by DE?
3.1.3.3 Are all pipe weld fittings per ANSI B16.9 with ASTM A 403, grade WP-316L or WP-304L material?
3.1.3.4 Are KC type mechanical joints in stainless steel piping made by means of ASTM A 182 F316 buttwelded
hubs (KC 155), and type 17-4PH teflon-coated seal rings (KC 162)?
Do bimetallic-pipe mechanical joints utilize an ASTM A266, Class III, clamp assembly (KC155), and a Type
17-4PH teflon-coated _ (KC162)?
Were all KC-type mechanical joints assembled in accordance with KC163 with adequate space allowance
for disengagement?
Where industrial flange type mechanical joints used, are they in accordance with ANSI B16.5?
3.1.4 Are stainless steel piping runs fabricated by buttwelding per KSC-SPEC-Z-O003 or KSC-SPEC-Z-O016, or
ANSI 13,31.3,and were all buttwelds lO0-percent radiographically inspected?
NOTE: Some exceptions to these requirements are detailed in KSC-STD-Z-O005, Paragraph
3.1.4.
PIPING AND TUBING INSTALLATIONS
3.1.5 Are tubing and piping nJn$external to pneumatic regulation/control panels identified inaccordance with KSC-
STD-SF-O004 and KSC-SPEC-Z-O008?
3.20.2.1 Is distribution plumbing pfo_ded with high and low point drains? (Applicable only if in-place cleaning is
required.)
NOTE: Comments should be
made on separate sheets for
all questions answered 9.2.
Reviewer's Name:
Date:
Extension:
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Requirements Checklist for KSC-STD-Z-0005
PNEUMATIC GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
Spec
GENERAL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Identification Number(s)
Service
Yes, No
Section Requirements or N/A
3.20.2.4
3.21.1
3.21.2
3.21.3
3.22.1
3.22.2
FLEXIBLE HOSES
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.2.3
Do fluid sampling ports conform to Figure 7 of KSC-STD-Z-O005?
Do all pipe supports, anchors, hangers, etc. conform to the requirements of ANSI B31.3?
Are all flared-tubing supports per KSC-SPEC-Z-O008 and are all supports and mounting hardware of the
Unistrut type or equivalent?
Are all pipe and tube support welds in a¢cordance with KSC-SPEC-Z-O004?
Is the maximum allowable woddng stress of distribution plumbing in accordance with ANSI B31.3?
Has the distribution plumbing been hydrostatic or pneumatic tested in accordance with ANSI B31.3?
Are piping and tubing sections (individual lengths or fabncated assemblies) identified by an attached metal
band (75M04185), marked per KSC-STD-E-O015, with the pipe/tubing size, schedule/wall thickness, test
pressure, date of test, and part number or other identifying nomenclature?
Are all flexible hoses used only for hook up of portable equipment or to provide for movement between
interconnecting fluid lines when no other feasible moans are avaJlable?
Do all flexible hoses consist of a seamless potytetrafluoumethylene or compounded polytetrafluou roethylene
inner tube reinforced with a 300-series stainless steal wire construction of braid or spiral wrap or a
combination thereof, ordo they consist of a flexible 300-series stainless steel pressure cartier reinfomed with
300-series stainless steel braid?
Are all flexible hoses provided with 300-series or 17-4PH stainless steel (condition H1025 or greater) end
fittings of the coupling-nut, 37-degree flared type or with mechanical joint fittings to mate with the
appropriately sized pipe hub (KC 159)?
NOTE: Type 17-4PH and Type 303 stainless steel are particularly sensitive to stress corrosion
in the KSC environment and shall be protected per paragraph 3.17.4 of KSC-STD-Z-
0005. Also, for hoses used in hydrogen service, 17-4PH stainless steel shall not come
in contact with pressurized hydrogen.
t
t
NOTE: Comments should be
made on separate sheets for
all questions answered n...9.o.
Reviewer's Name:
Date:
Extension:
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Requirements Checklist for KSC-STD-Z-0005
PNEUMATIC GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
Spec
GENERAL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Identification Number(s)
Service
Yes, No
Section Requirements or N/A
3.2.4
3.2.5
3.2,6.1
3.2.6.2
3.2.6.3
3.22.1
3.22.2
Are all flexible hoses providad with an identification tag per 75M04185 which is permanentiy and legibly
marked per KSC-STD-E-O015 with the following informaUon:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Date (month and year) of hydrostatic test?
Maximum rated working pressure?
KSC pert number if applicable?
Vendor name and pert number?.
Service media (only for dedicated system fluid hoses in support of any hydrocarbon or
hypergolic fluid system)?
Is the insert/ice time period between inspections for each _xible hose specified in the appropriate
engineering documentation for each system and is the date of the fast inspection, the inspection procedure,
and inspection organization documented by a tag on the hose?
Do all flex_e hoses pressurized to 150 peJg or greater comply with the restraint requirements specified in
KSC-STD-Z-O005, Section 3.2.6.1 (KHB 1710.2 SOP41)?
If any flexible metal hoses or unlined bellows are used, has a flowqnduced vibration analysis per JSC08123
been performed?
Are any polytetrafluouroethylene or compounded polytetralluouroethylene inner tube hoses used where
permeation of gases through the inner tube would be unacceptable?
Is the maximum allowabts woddng pressure less or equal to one-fourth of the specified burnt pressure of the
flexible hoses (see 3.2.1)?
Have all flexible hoses been hydrostatioaily tested to a minimum of 1-1/2 times the ma_mum rated working
pressure?
PRESSURE GAGES
3.3.1 Do all pressure gages conform to the requirements of AN S11340.1 except as specified by KSC-STD-Z-O005,
paragraph 3.3.!?
3.3.2 Have all pressure gages been selected so that the normal working pressure falls within the middle half of
the scale range, except those gages used in applications that require a very wide range of operating
pressures, in which case the maximum pressure does not exceed the scale range of the gage?
NOTE: Comments should be
made on separate sheets for
all questions answered no__
Reviewer's Name:
Date:
Extension:
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Requirements Checklist for KSC-STD-Z-0005
PNEUMATIC GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
Spec
GENERAL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Identification Number(s)
Service
Yes, No
Section Requirements or N/A
3.3.3
3.3.4
3.18.1
3.18.2
Are all pressure gages made of one-piece, solid front case construction utili;,ing a window made of high-
impact non-cracking plastic, heat treated glass or laminated glass, and a full-diameter pressure relief back
case construction, and are all gages designed for flush front-panel mounting?
Are all pressure gage materials normally in contact with the service fluid type 316 stainless steel?
Are all pressure gages provided with a bourbon-tube bleeder or equivalent?
Do all pressure gages operating upto 10,000 Ibhn=have a low-back type pressure connection with a MS
33649-4 port and do pressure gages operating above 10,000 Ibhn=have a ll4-inch superpressure port with
a 9/16-18 internal thread?
Are all pressure gages designed for in-placa calibration checkout and trouble-shooting utilizing portable test
equipment, if required?
Have all pressure gages been calibrated per manufacturer's specifications and limitations of acceptable
pedormanca stated in the maintenance/calibration instructions?
Is each pressure gage, pressure switch, or pressure transducer provided with an isolation valve and test port
between the isolation valve and the pressure-acfuated device?
Is each test port either a bulk-head fitting (KC150C4 and KC124C4) or a plugged 1/4-inch superpressure
bulkhead coupling assembly (KC169), depending on the pressure requirements?
Is the volume communicating with test port between the isolation valve and the pressure gage less than or
equal to 1.50 cubic inches, except when a vent valve is provided between the isolation valve and the
pressure-actuatad device?
RELIEF VALVES
3.4.2
3.4.3
Is overpressure protection provided by means of a single conventional safety-relief valve or pilot-operetad
safety relief valve exoept as dessdhed in KSC-STD-Z-0005, paragraph 3.4.2?
For pressure vessels, does the relief valve installation conform to ASME Code, Section VIII, Division 1,
paragraph UG-135? For systems, is a relief valve provided as close as practical downstream of each
pressure reducing device (regulator) or downstream of any pressure source (compressors, gas rechargers,
etc.) whenever any portion of the downstream system cannot withstand the full upstream pressure?
NOTE: Comments should be
made on separate sheets for
all questions answered n...9.o.
Reviewer's Name:
Date:
Extension:
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Requirements Checklist for KSC-STD-Z-0005
PNEUMATIC GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
Spec
GENERAL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Identification Number(s)
Service
Yes, No
Section Requirements or N/A
3.4.4
3.4.5
3.4.6
3.4.7
3.4.8
For pressure vessels, does the total required relieving capacity conform to requirements of ASME Code,
Section VIII, Division 1, paragraph UG-133 or Division 2, paragraph AR150?
For systems, does the relieving capacity prevent the pressure from rising more than 10% above the system
design pmseure in accordance with ANSI/ASME B31.3, paragraphs 301.2 and 322.6.3?
For pressure vessels, are the relief valves set to operate no higher than the MAWP?
For systems, are the relief valves set to operate no higher than the system design pressure?
Are all relief valve set limits specified in OMRSD's or other oparating and maintenance documents?
Are all relief valves constructed of 300-series stainless steel per ASTM A 276, ASTM A 314, ASTM A 582,
or QQ-S-763, or if relief valves are cast, are they constructed of ASTM A 351, grade CF8M or grade CF8
matedal?
Do all relief valve pressure connections for flared tube applications have internal threads per KSC-STD-Z-
0005, paragraph 3.1.1.3.1.2 and do all relief valve pressure connections for piping applications mate with
appropriately sized hub (KC 159)?
Is inlet/outiet line size equal to or greater than port size of relief valves?
Have the effects of discharge from relief valves been assessed to ensure operation of relief valves will not
be hazardous to personnel or equipment?.
NOTE: Items to be considered are thrust loads, noise, impingement of high-velocity gas or entrained
particles, toxicity, oxygen enrichment and flammability.
3.4.9
3.4.10
Are all pressure relief valves marked with manufacturer's name, serial number, part number, KSC part
number (if applicable), and set pressure?
Do all relief valves require pedodic retest and is the retest interval specified in the OMRSD or other
maintenance documents?
NOTE: Comments should be
made on separate sheets for
all questions answered n_9_o.
Reviewer's Name:
Date:
Extension:
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Requirements Checklist for KSC-STD-Z-0005
PNEUMATIC GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
GENERAL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Identification Number(s)
Service
Spec
Section Requirements
Yes, No
or N/A
PRESSURE REGULATORS
3.5.1 Were pressure regulators selected to maintain set outlet pressures within requimcl system tolerance over
the entire range of expected flow rates and were balanced-valve pressure regulators used where widely
varying inlet pressures would cause the set outlet pressure to exceed required tolerances?
NOTE: For each stage of regulation, it is desirable the ratioof upstream pressure to downstrearn prsssure
should not exceed 4 for optimum control of pressure and flow and to minimize problems in sizing
relief valves. Standard commercially available cylinder regulators (including gages) are acceptable
for applications uUlizing k-bottles as the pressure source.
3.5.2 Are all pressure regulator bodies constructed of 300-series stainless steel and do all materials that normally
contact the service fluid conform to the manufacturer's recommendations and the compatibility requirements
of 79K09561 and, or 79K11948?
t
3.5.3
3.5.4
3.5.5
Are all dome-loaded pressure regulators of the externally loaded type and is the dome capable of operating
at the maximum rated inlet pressure of the regulator?.
Is the regulator diaphragm/piston able to withstand a differential pressure equal to the maximum system
rated inlet/outlet pressure with no damage?
Do all mechanically adjusted regulating devices reach a positive stop at both ends of the adjustment range,
without disassembly of the pressure-containing parts upon appUcatlon of a force?
For flared-tubing applications, are pressure regulators provided with internally threaded ports per KSC-STD-
Z-O005, paragraph 3.1.1.3.1.27
For piping applications, are pressure regulators provided with inlet and outlet connections that will mate with
the appropnately sized pipe hub (KC 159)?
t
m
m
3.10.1 Were all pressure-regulating circuits designed according to system requirements including the required
accuracy of regulation, minimum and maximum flow rates, required reliability and operational
requirements?
Are preesure-regulating circuits configured as per Fig_Jres 1 through 4 of KSC-STD-Z-0005?
NOTE: Comments should be
made on separate sheets for
all questions answered n_2.
Reviewer's Name:
Date:
Extension:
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Requirements Checklist for KSC-STD-Z-0005
PNEUMATIC GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
GENERAL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Identification Number(s)
Service
Spec
Section Requirements
Yes, No
or N/A
3.10.3
3.10.4
3.10.5
3.10.6
3.10.7
3.10.8
3.10.9
3.18.1
3.18.2
Were redundant regulating circuits designed forautomatic ewitchover and in such a manner that components
in either flow circuit can be repaired in place or be removed and replaced without interrupting the flow int
he parallel dmuit?
Are inlet and outlet isolation valves and appropriate intermediate vent valves provided for shutdown and
maintenance?
Are inlet/outlat isolation valves designed for bi-direetional service?
NOTE: Normal venting shall not backflow filters.
Are relief valves located as close as practical to pressure-regulator outlets and do they meet the
requirements of KSC-STD-Z-0005, Section 3.4?
Are all pressure regulating circuits designed so that all components can easily by removed and replaced with
space allowance made for disengagement of mechanical joints?
Is the use of check valves as the sole preseure-isolation device for maintenance and repair operations
involving opening of the pressure system avoided?
Are pressure-regulating drcuits designed with the capability of maintaining outlet pressure within required
tolerances at a flow rate not less than 20 percent above the normal system requirements?
Are the limits of valiation allowed on the inlet and outlet pressures of each pressure regulator in a circuit
stated in the opareting instructions and on the mechanical schematic?
Is a teat connection and a vent valve provided in the dome-loading circuit downstream of the loading
regulator in accordance with KSC-STD-Z-0005, Section 3.18?
NOTE: It is desirable that dome-loading pressure regulators be loaded by means of a separate
spring-loaded, hand-operated regulator having an automatic downstream pressure-relief
capability. A separate relief valve is not normally required in regulator dome-loading
cimuite.
Are pressure regulating circuit components such as pressure gages, pressure switches, ternpemtum gages,
traneducem, regulator dome-loading circuits, and relief valves designed for in-place calibration/checkout, and
troubleshooting utilizing portable test equipment, if required?
Is each pressure gage, pressure switch, and pressure transducer in a pressure regulating circuit provided
with an isolation valve and a test port between the isolation valve and the pressure-actuated device?
m
t
NOTE: Comments should be
made on separate sheets for
all questions answered n._9.o.
Reviewer's Name:
Date:
Extension:
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Requirements Checklist for KSC-STD-Z-0005
PNEUMATIC GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
GENERAL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Identification Number(s)
Service
Spec
Section Requirements
Yes, No
or N/A
Is each dome-loading regulator in a pressure regulating circuit provided with a test pert and a vent valve
downstream of the loading regulator?.
Is each test pert either a capped bulk-head Fitting (KC 150 C4 and KC 124 C4) or a plugged 1/44nch
8uperpressure bulkhead coupling assembly (KC 169), depending on the pm_Jre requirements?
Is the volume communicating with test port between the isolation valve and the pressure-actuated device
lees or equal to 1.50 cubic inches, except when a vent valve is provided between he isolation valve and the
pressure-actuated device?
Whenever pressure gages, pressure switches, and pressure transducers sensing the same are manifolded
together, are they provided with a common isolation valve, test port and vent valve between the isolation
valve and the pressure actuated devices?
PRESSURE VESSELS
3.6.1 Are all pressure vessels designed, constructed, tested and certified and code stamped in accordance with
the ASME Code Section VIII, Division 1 or2, or DOT 49 CFR?
Are all pressure vessels documented for recertification per KHB 1710.15?
3.6.2 Were T-1 steel or other alloys with substantially the same properties such as SA514 and SA517 avoided for
pressure vessels?
3.6.3 Were all of the ASME Code pressure vessels provided with at least one opening for connection so system
piping and another opening for inspection?
3.6.4 Were all pressure vessel openings provided with connection that will mate with the appropriately sized pipe
hub (KC 159)?
3.6.5
3.16.2
Are the maximum working pressure at which the vessel will be normally operated and the name of the
working fluid dearly painted on the pressure vessel and legible at 50 feet? (Where multiple vessels are used
to store the same working fluid, only the most viable vessel in the group need be labeled.)
Are all pressure vessels bonded and grounded in accon:lance with KSC-STD-E-O012?
3.22.1 Isthe maximum allowable working stress inaccordance with ASME Code Section VIII, Division 1 or Division
2, as applicable?
NOTE: Comments should be
made on separate sheets for
all questions answered n__.o_o.
Reviewer's Name:
Date:
Extension:
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Requirements Checklist for KSC-STD-Z-0005
PNEUMATIC GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
Spec
GENERAL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Identification Number(s)
Service
Yes, No
Section Requirements or N/A
3.22.2
3.24.1
Have all pressure vessels been hydrostatically or pneumatically tested inaccordance with KSC-STD-Z-0005,
paragraph 3.6.1?
Are all pressure vessels assigned a unique identification on engineering drawings and a tag aUached to the
vessel? (Ref: KSC-GP-435, Vol.1)
SHUTOFF/METERING VALVES
3.7.1 Are all shutoff/metering valves constructed of 300-series stainless steel per ASTM A 276, ASTM A 314,
ASTM A 182, QQ-S-763, or if valves are cast, are they constructed of ASTM A 351, grade CF8M or grade
CF8 matedal?
Are all materials that normally contact the service fluid compatible per 79K09561 and, or 79K11948?
3.7.2 Has the use of manual valves that utilize extemal balancing ports or vents open to the atmosphere been
avoided7
3.7.3 Do all shutoff/metering valves with pressure connections for flared tube applications have intemal threads
per KSC-STC-Z-0005, paragraph 3.1.1.3.1.2?
Do valves used in piping systems have connections to mate with appropriately sized pipe hub (KC 159)?
3.7.4 Is valve-stem travel on all valves limited by a positive stop at each extreme position and will the application
of force to the stem-positioning device no..._tcause disassembly of the pressure-containing structure of the
valve?
Do all stem-position indicators sense position of the stem directly, and not the position of the actuating
device?
Are all shutoff valves capable of isolating full-rated pressure from either side, and are they installed in
accordance with the manufacturer's recommended flow direction for normal operation in each particular
application?
Are all split-body valves utilizing fiat nonmetallic body gaskets designed to restrain the gasket radially, and
are they provided with concentric serrations on the body halves mating with the gasket faces?
Are all shutoff/metering valves used in flared-tubing system applications designed for panel mounting?
NOTE: Comments should be
made on separate sheets for
all questions answered no__
Reviewer's Name:
Date:
Extension:
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Requirements Checklist for KSC-STD-Z-0005
PNEUMATIC GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
GENERAL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Identification Number(s)
Service
Spec Yes, No
Section Requirements or N/A
FILTERS
3.8.1
3.8.2
3.8.3
3.8.6
3.8.7
Have filtersbeen installed immediately upstream of all interfaces where control of particulate matter is cdticaJ
and at all appropriate points where control of particulate migration is desired, and was selection of filters
done based on overall system performance in order to maximize protection of cdtical components with the
least amount of pressure drop?
Do filters have replaceable elements?
Are all filter housings and elements constructed of 300-series stainless steel?
Are all materials that normally contact the service fluid compatible per 79K09561 and, or 79K11948?
Do all filter elements maintain filtering quality without being damaged in any way when subjected to
maximum system design flow rate and dogged to maximum design capability?
Are largest pore or hole sizes of all filters determined in accordance with ARP 901 ?
Do filters, found in flared-tubing systems, have inlet and outlet ports per KSC-STD-Z-O005, paragraph
3.1.1.3.1.2, and are differential pressure ports when present per MS33649-4?
For piping systems applications, are filters provided with connections that will mate with appmpnate pipe hub
(KC 159)?
Are definite maintenance requirements and instructions for filters included in the operating and maintenance
instructions?
Does the design provide adequate clearance for filter element replacement, and do designs invoMng
straight-line filters provide for replacement of the complete filter assembly with a spare?
Are filters permanently marked with manufacturer's name, the KSC and, or manufacturer's part number, flow
direction, rated operating pressure, and selial number (if applicable)?
m
NOTE: Comments should be
made on separate sheets for
all questions answered no__
Reviewer's Name:
Date:
Extension:
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APPENDIX C SAMPLE FORMS
Form Title Pa_e
DEVIATION/WAIVER/VARIANCE REQUEST .................................... C-1
PRESSURE VESSEL NAMEPLATE DATA SHEET ................................ C-2
ENGINEERING SUPPORT REQUEST .......................................... C-4
INSPECTION PLANNING MEMORANDUM ..................................... C-5
SAMPLE TABLE FOR FREQUENCY OF INSPECTION & TESTING ................... C-7
C-i

, i i ii
DEVIATION/WAIVER/VARIANCE REQUEST
I,
,,, ,,
[_ DEVIATION I [] WAIVER
2_REOUESTOR ORGN.
..... ..
3. CONTRACTOR 4. CONTRACT NO.
8°
J
7. DOCUMENT
10, REQUIREMENT
[] SAFETY VARIANCE
PHONE
O DEVIATION
O WAIVER
[7 EXEMPTION
DATE IREQUEST NO.
5. VEHICLE/GSE/EFFECTIVITY 6. TIME PERIOD/DURATION
FACILITY
TITLE 9. ITEM NO.
! I. DESCRIPTION
12. DETAILED RAI"IONALE
SAMPLE
!13. REMARKS
t,4. RE'QUIRED APPROVAL
CONTRACTOR NASA
[] DESIGN [] R&QA [] DESIGN C] R/OA
[]OPERATIONS [_ SAFETY []OPERATIONS [] SAFETY
15. TYPE 01_ PRINT NAME SIGNATURE _ ORGN. DATE
'-" i i i i
KSC FORM 20- 164B (7/81) C__].
GENERAL PHYSICS CORPORATION
:?:i:i_iii! ii ii :
:::/?!:::_?:PRESSURE VESSEL NAME PLATE DATA REVIEW
VESSEL LOCATION
FLUID CONTENTS
VESSEL DESIGNATION V
MANUFACTURED BY:
MANUFACTZIRER'S LOCATION:
MANUFACTURER'S SERIAL NUMBER:
MAXIMUM ALLOW. WORK PRESSURE
YEAR BUILT
DESIGN PRESSURE
HYDROSTATIC TEST PRESSURE
CORROSION ALLOW
DIAMETER IN
SHELL THICKNESS
HEAD THICKNESS
NATIONAL BOARD NO.
.psi A T _ *F
psi DESIGN TEMPERATURE *F
psi
IN
LENGTH IN
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
TYPE OF TANK." HORIZONTAL OR VERTICAL (Circle)
DESCRIBE FASTENINGS:
SAFETY VALVE OUTLETS: NUMBER." 7"_E_
SIZE:
SUPPORTS: SKIRT" YES
OTHER: (Describe)
L OCA TION:
NO LUGS (No.) LEGS (No.)
A TTA CHED:
REMARKS:
NAME: DATE:
(Continued)
C-2
FOR USE WITH CRYOGENIC VESSELS
USE THE FRONT OF THIS SHEET FOR THE EXTERNAL VESSEL AND SIDE 2 FOR THE INTERNAL
VESSEL
1NTERNAL VESSEL CONTENTS:
MANUFACTURED BY:
MANUFACTURER'S LOCATION:
MANUFACTURER'S SERIAL NUMBER:
MAXIMUM ALLOW. WORK PRESSURE _ psi A T
DESIGN PRESSURE psi DESIGN TEMPERA TURF.
HYDROSTATIC TEST PRESSURE
CORR OSION ALL 0 W
DIAMETER
SHELL THICKNESS
HEAD THICKNESS
YEAR BUILT NATIONAL BOARD NO.
ADDITIONAL INFORAfA TION:
*F
*F
IN LENGTH
psi
IN
IN
SAFETY VALVE OUTLETS: NUMBER:
SIZE: LOCATION:
REMARKS:
TYPE(S)
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SYSTEM NUMBER
PRIORITY GROUP
VESSEL IDEN17FICA TION
VESSEL MA WP
SYSTEM OPERATING PRESSURE
DATE
PREPARED BY
SHEET.._L.IOF
INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS:
REFF_REN(_E TABI_E
t'RgSSURE VESSEl,S
VESSEL CLAMPS & SUPPORT STRUCTURES
b'YSTEM PIPINq
VE 1/7
UT UT
THK VQL PT MT AET
THREADED FITTINGS & WELDS
RELIEF VALVES
PRESSUR_ GA(_E8 _ 8WITCHES
FLEXIBLE HOSES
SYSTEM VESSEL REQUIREMENTS
VESSEL/SYSTEM ACCF_.&SIBKX'rY
VESSEL INFERNAL ACCESSIBILITY
VESSEL ISOLATION/REMOVAL
COMPONENT ISOLATION/REMOVAL
EQUIPMEiCrREQUIREMENTS
WATER
o_/COMP_SED AIR
I_=FR/CrI'Y
C-5
TEST REQUIREMENTS
SCHEDUUNG/APPROVAL
SYSTEM ISOLATION/DEPRE_UR/ZATION
SPECIAL VALVE ALIGNMENT
JPL PERSONNEL REQUIRED
SYSTEM R.EINSTALLATION
CLEANING REQUIREMENTS
PRE INSPECTION
PAINT/INSULATION REMOVAL
SURFACE PREPARATION
INTERaNAL PREPARATION
AREA PREPARATION
POST INSPECriON
_PAnVr/P_SULATE
DEW POINT/HYDROCARBON TESTS
DRYING/PURGING
DRAINING
SPECIAL TOOLS/EQUIPMENT
FITTINGS
FLEX HOSES
VALVES REGULATORS
LIGHTING
HAND TOOLS
POWER P_UIPMENT
SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
DATE
PREPARED BY
SHEET .....2._ OF
PROPER VENTILATION
HAZARDS TO PERSONNEL/EQUIPMENT
SPECIAL CLOTHING
SECURING TEST PIECES/EQUIP_
C-6
TEST METHOD REQUIRED AT TIME INTERVALS (YF_.ARI)
INITIAL
DESCRIPTION RECERTIFICATION 1 2 5 I0 20
Vessel
Vessel Clamps & Support Structures
System Piping
All Threaded Fittings & Welds
Relief Valves
Pressure Gages & Switches
Flexible Hose
INSPECTION AND TEST METHODS
AET
UT-THK
VE
VI
UT-VOL
BR
01)
= Acoustic Emission Testing CRVT
= Ultrasonic Thickness Measurement C
- F_emal V'm_al Examination PT
= Internal Visual E.ramination MT
•, Ultrasonic Volumetric Test 11150
- Bolt Re-T_ R
- Outside Diameter Measurement by Caliper
= Relief Valve Certification Test
= Calibration
= Liquid Dye Penetrant Examination
= Magnetic Particle Examination
= Hydrostatic Pressure Test
= RecertificationRequired
C-7
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